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Introduction
In Canada, they established Nunavut,1 but refused Quebec secession. 2 In
France, they set in motion a process to accord Corsica limited powers to
run its own affairs. 3 The Faroese plan a referendum on independence from
t Professor of Law, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. My thanks are due
to Jane Wright and Franoise Hampson, colleagues at Essex, Prof. A. E. Dick Howard,
School of Law, University of Virginia, Prof. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., School of Law,
Washington and Lee University, and Prof. Michel Lesage, Paris. Needless to add, the
views expressed and any errors are mine alone. The ideas in this paper were presented
to the United Nations Working Group on Minorities in May 2001 and an earlier version
appeared on the Working Group's website. The author is grateful to the British Academy
for assisting him in attending the Working Group.
1. See Nunavut Act, C.R.C., ch. 28, § 79(1) (1993) (Can.) (establishing Nunavut as
from April 1, 1999). See also Anne Mcllroy, A New Inuit Government Is About To Redraw
The Map Of Canada, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 17, 1999, at 15; Julian Borger, The Promised
Land, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 22, 1999, at 2-3.
2. Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). See also SELF-DETER-
MINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONs LEARNED (Anne F. Bayefsky ed.,
2000).
3. Jon Henley, Corsica Nears Self-Rule, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 29, 2000, at 14. See
also Jon Henley, Corsica Killings Put Deal At Risk, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 12, 2000, at 16;
Jon Henley, Jospin Ally Set To Quit Over Corsica, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug., 28 2000, at 12;
Jon Henley, Senior French Minister Quits, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 30, 2000, at 11; Jon
Henley, Bad Marks For The Professor, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 27, 2001, at 13. The plans,
however, seem to be on hold, if not moribund. See New Prison For Corsican Rebels,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 29, 2001, at 14. See also Cons. Const., Jan. 17, 2002, J.O., Deci-
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Denmark in 200 1.4 In the United Kingdom, various degrees of autonomy
were accorded to Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. 5 NATO war-
planes undertook a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) in order to force the latter to confer greater autonomy to
Kosovo. 6 The European Court of Human Rights has talked of a "demo-
cratic restructuring" without destroying the territorial integrity of Turkey
with respect to its Kurdish population, 7 and that a group of persons might
call for autonomy or even secession of part of a country's territory, but that
would not automatically justify banning the group's assemblies.8
And yet, despite the above, there is no express, extant right to auton-
omy in international law for groups within States. International law does
accord a right of self-determination to peoples. On the other hand, States
owe a much weaker obligation to persons belonging to minorities; they shall
not be denied the right to enjoy their culture in community with other
members of the group. However, this distinction between peoples and
minorities in international instruments is a purely legal creation, especially
when no definition of either type of entity has proved possible. Since there
is no definition, then no one can deny that a particular group might form a
minority within the State and, at the same time, qualify as a people:
[The] issues of self-determination, the treatment of minorities, and the sta-
tus of indigenous populations, are the same, and the segregation of [these]
topics is an impediment to fruitful work. The rights and claims of groups
with their own cultural histories and identities are in principle the same-
sion No. 2001-454 D.C., available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/
2002/2001454/texte.htm.
4. Cf. Isambard Wilkinson, Basques 'To Defy Madrid With Poll On Breakaway,' DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), July 24, 2001, at 17; Giles Tremlett, Spain Vows To Block Basque
Referendum, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 31, 2001, at 11 (reports that the Basque region in
Spain has unilaterally planned to hold a referendum on self-determination without
approval from Madrid and, therefore, contrary to the Spanish Constitution, reveals the
tension on this matter).
5. See Government of Wales Act 1998, c. 38 (Eng.); Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46
(Eng.); Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiation, Apr. 10, 1998, Eng.-Ir., 37
l.L.M. 751 (1998) [hereinafter Northern Ireland Peace Agreement]; Northern Ireland
Act, 1998, c. 47 (Eng.).
6. See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999,
Kosovo-Serb.-Yugoslavia, available at http://www.state.gov/ www/regions/eur/ksvo
rambouillettext.html [hereinafter Rambouillet Agreement]; S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR,
54th Sess., 4011 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999); Military Technical Agreement,
June 9, 1999, KFOR-Serb.-Yugoslavia, available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/opera-
tions/kfor/mta.htm (speaking of Kosovo as remaining within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia). See also Gillian Sandford, Milosevic Challenges UN By Planning Kosovo Poll,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 31, 2000, at 13; Gillian Sandford, Kostunica Courts Serbia's Old
Foes, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 17, 2000, at 22. See infra notes 71 and 147.
7. See United Communist Party of Turk. v. Turkey, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 121, 133 (1998) [hereinafter TBKP]. See also OZDEP v. Turkey, App. No.
23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, 703 (1999) ("It is of the essence of democracy to allow
diverse political projects to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question
the way a State is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy
itself .. .").
8. Stankov & United Maced. Org. Ilinden v. Bulgaria, App. Nos. 29221/95 &
29225/95 (2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
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they must be. It is the problems of implementation of principles and stan-
dards which vary, simply because the facts will vary .... This association of
categories is not generally accepted, and the separation of categories is one
reason for the hesitant approach to the definition of 'peoples' or 'minorities'
or 'indigenous populations.'
9
The traditional interpretation of self-determination was that it was
external in character and applied to situations of colonial domination or
racist regimes. It will be argued here that self-determination is increasingly
recognized as having an internal aspect that requires full and effective par-
ticipation by all groups in society. This paper will consider autonomy as a
method of affording internal self-determination to minorities who form
part of the peoples of the State. The question is whether there is an obliga-
tion on States in international law to facilitate autonomy for minority
groups as part of the right to self-determination or even as part of some
wider conception of minority rights. Autonomy connotes degrees of con-
trol over one's own affairs. Dictionary definitions refer to it as self-govern-
ment from its Greek etymological roots. It will initially be considered in
terms of self-government of a region of a State where the group forms a
sufficiently substantial proportion of the local population. 10 However,
autonomy with regard to minority populations can be read wider than just
self-government, and the 'right to autonomy' argued for in this paper may
be satisfied in appropriate circumstances through control of the group's
own cultural affairs rather than through territorial self-government. 1 It
will be argued that the test as to the necessary degree of autonomy should
be whether, having regard to the particular group in question, it is being
included in the governance of the State to the fullest extent appropriate.
Thus, this article challenges two orthodoxies: first, that minority groups
have no right to self-determination and, secondly, that there can be no
9. lan Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 1, 16 (James Crawford ed., 1992). The European Court of Human Rights
acknowledged the difficulties in defining minorities in Gorzelik v. Polonel, App. No.
44158/98 (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, December 20, 2001, 62).
See also, Ian Brownlie, 255 Hague Recueil (1995), at 55-61; THOMAS MUSGRAVE, SELF-
DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1997); Edward Mortimer, Neelan Tiruchelvam
Memorial Lecture at Chatham House, London, 'Minority Rights: A United Nations Per-
spective' (January 25, 2001). Nor is a rigid distinction drawn in the writings of histori-
ans and political scientists between nations, peoples, indigenous peoples and minorities.
See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 27 (1995) [hereinafter Kymlicka
1995].
10. Self-government, though, does not mean exclusive government of a territory; no
one would deny that the states of the United States of America are autonomous, but they
have no powers to conduct foreign relations. It is the Canadian federal government, not
the provinces, that has the principal responsibility of upholding criminal law in Canada.
See also Ross. Gazeta, 15 July, 1997 (decision of the Federal Russian Constitutional
Court with respect to Article 66.4 of the Federal Constitution on the relative compe-
tences of different types of 'subject of the Federation' under Article 5 of the 1993 Consti-
tution. I am indebted to Professor M. Lesage for a copy of his note to the Council of
Europe on the implications of the decision). See also Vladimir Kartashkin & Aslan
Abashidze, Study on the Use of Autonomy Approaches in the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/WP.3 (2001).
11. See infra note 55.
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legal right to autonomy since a right to autonomy would require interven-
tion in the political systems and structures of a sovereign State.
The structure of this paper is to look first at the 'State' and the 'nation.'
The reason for this preliminary examination is the symbiotic relationship
between the State, a legal fiction, and the nations, which are historico-polit-
ical fictions, that constitute States. Non-dominant nations within the State
will aspire to the greatest degree of self-government and autonomous con-
trol of their own affairs of which they believe themselves capable. As such,
these concepts and their teleological differences need to be noted. The dis-
tinction between the State and the nation is followed by a consideration of
the specific references to autonomy in international instruments. Given,
however, that there is no general, international minority rights treaty grant-
ing, inter alia, autonomy, then the relationship between the acknowledged
right to self-determination and autonomy has to be analyzed. Whereas
self-determination originally applied only to situations of decolonization
and alien domination, where secession was an appropriate method of
implementation, now its ambit extends to each State in order to guarantee
participation by all groups within society where autonomy is a more appro-
priate means of meeting the collective aspirations of all types of group.
The ultimate aim is to show that there is an emerging right to autonomy
that has developed from the right to self-determination, but which is in fact
broader than self-determination and is not confined to "peoples." The con-
tent of this emerging right is also examined, for a right to autonomy means
little if the scope of autonomy in this context is left unexplored. Develop-
ing from the traditional and contrary stance of international law with
respect to minority groups, this paper advocates, at the very minimum, a
new interpretation and remit for existing rights and, potentially, for the
adoption of a new right.
I. The State and the Nation 1 2
The State itself is a legal institution, most succinctly defined in the
Montevideo Convention 1933: "The State as a person in international law
should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) a capacity to enter into
relations with other States."'13 As such, it is a contrivance, a legal fiction,
but one with immense consequences because of the fourth self-fulfilling
requirement-it can enter into relations with other States.
12. See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in
Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 360-65 (1996). See also Thomas M. Franck,
Fairness to 'Peoples' and their Right to Self-Determination, in THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 140-69 (1995); SUSAN R. MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF
ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY
(2000).
13. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19. See also THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER & CYNTHIA WEBER, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS
SOCIAl CONSTRUCT (1996). For an analysis of the degrees of Statehood, see HURST HAN-
NUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 16 et seq. (1996) [hereinafter
HANNUM 1996].
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The nation, on the other hand, is just as much of a contrivance, but
this time one of historians and political scientists-in the words of Benedict
Anderson, it is "an imagined political community."'14 Gellner goes further,
claiming that "nationalism engenders nations, and not the other way
round ... [using] the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of
cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most
often transforms them radically. Dead languages can be revived, traditions
invented, quite fictitious pristine purities restored.' 1 5 Moreover, most
'nations' actually fail to fulfill their promise and do not transmogrify into
States.
16
International lawyers have shied away from the nation and have con-
centrated on their own construct, the State. Carty claims that international
legal theorists view the State as an order of competences with no "neces-
sary connection with 'their' populations or territories."'1 7 Population and
territory may be conditions of Statehood, but once recognized in interna-
tional law, the State itself is a mere legal construct. As such, international
law has not coped well with internal self-determination and autonomy,
because it "does not recognize or accept as a matter of legal concern a
necessary connection between a territory and the people which may
inhabit it."' 8
States are rarely mono-ethnic; but rather are composed of various dif-
ferent groups, different 'nations." 9 Non-dominant groups within the State
14. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6 (2d ed. 1991). See also HUGH SETON-WATSON, NATIONS AND
STATES: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM 5
(1977) (concluding that no scientific definition of a nation is possible); BRIAN JENKINS &
SPYROS A. SOFOS, NATION AND IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE (1996); Andrew Thomp-
son & Ralph Fevre, The National Question: Sociological Reflections on Nation and Nation-
alism, 7:3 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 297 (2001).
15. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS & NATIONALISM 55-56 (1983). Cf. Anthony D. Smith,
Nations And Their Pasts, 2 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 358 (1996); Ernest Gellner, Do
Nations Have Navels?, 2 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 366 (1996); Anthony D. Smith, Memory
And Modernity: Reflections On Ernest Gellner's Theory Of Nationalism, 2 NATIONS &
NATIONALISM 371 (1996). See generally ANTHONY D. SMITH, MYTHS AND MEMORIES OF THE
NATION (1999); THE STATE OF THE NATION (John A. Hall ed., 1998). See also LONGWORTH,
infra note 29, at 171-75; HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE 46 (Sten
Berglund, Tomas Hellen & Frank H. Aarebrot eds., 1998).
16. GELLNER, supra note 15, at 49. See also C.A. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND
NATIONAL MINORITIES (1968).
17. ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 5 (1986). See also id. at
113-15; Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991).
18. CARTY, supra note 17, at 5 (emphasis added). See also Martti Koskenniemi,
National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 241, 243-44 (1994); Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State Groups in
International Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 481 (1992); Franck, Clan and Superclan, supra
note 12, at 382.
19. On ratifying the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minori-
ties, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein both entered reservations that they had no national
minorities. "The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg understands by 'national minority' in the
meaning of the Framework Convention, a group of people settled for numerous genera-
tions on its territory, having the Luxembourg nationality and having kept distinctive
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will usually seek to preserve their identity in terms of their religion, their
language and their culture rather than be assimilated into the majority.
The belief that every State is a nation, or that all sovereign States are national
States, has done much to obfuscate human understanding of political reali-
ties. A State is a legal and political organization, with the power to require
obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a community of people,
whose members are bounded together in a sense of solidarity, common cul-
ture, a national consciousness. Yet in the common usage of English and
other modern languages these two distinct relationships are frequently
confused.20
Autonomy is ordinarily granted to groups, defined territorially or by some
characteristic, within a State. These groups might be called a 'nation,' or
sometimes a 'people,' or sometimes a 'minority;' none of these terms are
defined in international law. It is the interplay of the State and these
groups that shapes the practical implementation of any 'right' to autonomy
in practice. 2 '
Some might argue that there can be no right to autonomy in interna-
tional law, because it is not possible to compel a State to order its constitu-
tion in a particular way; such would be an interference in the "domestic
jurisdiction" of a State contrary to Article 2.7 of the Charter. To that
extent, the right of the minority group might only be to participate in the
governance of the State and, where that is wholly denied, to secede under a
'right to self-determination.' However, international organizations have
presumed themselves to have the right to tell a State to amend its electoral
laws and there is nothing to suggest that they could not require a State to
enter into negotiations in good faith regarding autonomy, rather than sanc-
tion, through secession and subsequent recognition, an interference in the
territorial integrity of a State; NATO governments were prepared to use
force in order to compel the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to negotiate a
grant of territorial autonomy within the Republic to Kosovo. 2 2
characteristics in an ethnic and linguistic way. On the basis of this definition, the Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg is induced to establish that there is no 'national minority' on its
territory." Declaration contained in a letter from the Permanent Representative of Lux-
embourg (July 20, 1995) (on file with author; original in French).
20. SETON-WATSON, supra note 14, at 1.
21. Not all groups defined in terms of their national origin go on to form a State. See
MACARTNEY, supra note 16, at 518-19 (giving the Ruthenians of the Carpathians as an
example). See also Charles Taylor, Why Do Nations Have to Become States?, in RECON-
CILING THE SOLITUDES 49 (Guy Laforest ed., 1993). Regarding the International Union
Romani's desire for non-territorial nationhood, infra note 134.
22. Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 134 (Can.). See also Letter
from the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) to the government of
Macedonia, infra note 199; Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, App. No. 9267/81, 10
Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 20 (1988) (dissent). The NATO threat was that without, inter
alia, good faith negotiations, force would be used against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia which, ultimately, it was. See Rambouillet Agreement, supra note 6; S.C. Res.
1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199,
U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N.
SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998); S.C. Res. 1244, supra note
6, Preamble, 10, 11, Annex 2 (discussing autonomy). See also Richard Norton-Taylor &
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Ian Black, The West's Message to Milosevic: 'This Time We Are Deadly Serious,' GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Oct. 2, 1998, at 18; Jonathan Steele, Kosovars Fear US Betrayal, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Oct. 5, 1998, at 13; lan Black, Martin Walker & Stephen Bates, Air Strikes Imminent US
Tells Milosevic, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 6, 1998, at 15; lan Black, Divided Allies Hesitate at
the Brink, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 7, 1998, at 16; Martin Walker, Jonathan Steele & Rich-
ard Norton-Taylor, Serbs Get Air Strike Ultimatum, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 9, 1998, at 1;
Richard Norton-Taylor, Tough Talk Masks Lack of Debate, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 9, 1998,
at 4; Martin Walker, 'This is Not a Time to Back Down,' GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 9, 1998, at
5; Jonathan Steel, Martin Walker & Richard Norton-Taylor, NATO Close to Serb Deal,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 12, 1998, at 1;Jonathon Steele, The Diplomats Get Close To a Deal
But in Kosovo the Misery Goes On, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 13, 1998, at 1; Martin Walker &
Chris Bird, Push to Get Monitors to Kosovo as US Insists NATO Threat Stays, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Oct. 14, 1998, at 1; Seamus Milne & Richard Norton-Taylor, Air Strike Diplomacy
Ups the Odds, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 14, 1998, at 19; Chris Bird, Kosovo Massacre 'was
Ordered,' GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 29, 1999, at 13; Chris Bird & Ian Black, Kosovo: 21 Days
to a Deal, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 30, 1999, at 2; Chris Bird, Kosovo Rebels Agree to Talk,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 3, 1999, at 2; Chris Bird & Ian Black, Serbians to Join Kosovo Peace
Talks, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 5, 1999, at 14; Chris Bird, Serbs Ground Kosovo Peace Talks
Team, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 6, 1999, at 2; Ian Black, Talks Begin but Killing Goes On in
Kosovo, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 8, 1999, at 10; Ian Black, Pressure Grows on Serbs, GUARD-
IAN (U.K.), Feb. 12, 1999; lan Black, Kosovo Talks Extended Amid Gloom, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Feb. 15, 1999, at 2; Richard Norton-Taylor, Britain Dispatches Tanks for Kosovo,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 16, 1999, at 13; Ian Black, Against the Clock, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Feb. 19, 1999, at 2; lan Black, Milosevic Holds Out with Snub to US, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb.
20, 1999, at 17; Martin Walker & Chris Bird, Serbs Crow at Impatient West, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Feb. 22, 1999, at 1; lan Black, Talks Impasse Takes Heat of Serbs, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Feb. 22, 1999, at 11; lan Black & Chris Bird, Kosovans Feel US Heat, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Feb. 23, 1999, at 2; Ian Black, Long Winding Road To Kosovo Peace, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb.
25, 1999, at 10; Chris Bird & Peter Beaumont, Convoys Raise Fears Of Assault On Kosovo,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 26, 1999, at 19; Peter Beaumont & Ian Black, Tension Mounted In
Kosovo Last Night, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 27, 1999, at 17; Peter Beaumont, We Will Fight
Until Kosovo Is Free, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 1, 1999, at 13; lan Black, Kosovo Talks Face
Uphill Struggle, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 15, 1999, at 2; Ian Black, All Eyes On Serbia As
KLA Agrees Peace Deal, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 16, 1999, at 14; Chris Bird, Homes Torched
By Serbs, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 17, 1999, at 17; lan Black & Richard Norton-Taylor,
Kosovo Talks On Brink Of Collapse: War Looms As Troops Assemble, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar.
18, 1999, at 13; Ian Black & Chris Bird, Britons Told to Get Out Before Raids on Serbia,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 20, 1999, at 1; Chris Bird & Julian Borger, War Looms as Serbs
Defy NATO, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 24, 1999, at 1; Chris Bird, The Onslaught Begins,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 25, 1999, at 1; Serb Atrocities in Kosovo Reported as NATO
Resumes Air Strikes, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 27, 1999, at 1; Stephen Bates, Bombers Target
Troops, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 29, 1999, at 1; Alex Brummer, When this Bloody War is
Over, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 30, 1999, at 1; NATO Shows There Can Be No Place for
Butchery, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 31, 1999, at 1; Ewan Macaskill, NATO Targets the Kill-
ers, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 1, 1999, at 2; West Looks to Create Safe Haven After Victory,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 5, 1999, at I;John Hooper, Helena Smith & Peter Beaumont, They
Vanished in the Night, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 8, 1999, at 1; Martin Walker, Maggie
O'Kane & Richard Norton-Taylor, Peace Plan as Fears Grow for 'Lost' Refugees, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Apr. 12, 1999, at 1; Ian Traynor & Michael White, War in Europe: Air Attacks Will
be Stepped Up, Says Prime Minister, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 13, 1999, at 1; Richard Nor-
ton-Taylor, UK to Send More Troops, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 14, 1999, at 2; John Hooper,
Ordeal of Serbs' Human Shields, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 15, 1999, at 3; lan Black, Public
Primed for Long Haul, Apr. 16, 1999, at 2; Ian Black, War in Europe: Alliance Wary of
Belgrade Concession, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 23, 1999, at 3; Richard Norton-Taylor, War in
Europe: What it Means if Troops Go In, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 23, 1999, at 5; Martin Kettle
& Alex Brummer, War in Europe: Crisis Atmosphere Spoils the Party, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Apr. 24, 1999, at 4; lan Traynor & Ian Black, Peace Plan Draws in Russia, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), May 7, 1999, at 4; Richard Norton-Taylor, NATO Cluster Bombs 'Kill 15' in Hospi-
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States' responses to minority groups within the population have
ranged from genocide to promoting the minority's sense of its own iden-
tity.23 There is a problem for the State, however, in that the more the
group's identity is promoted, the more it will see itself as different and
deserving of its own Statehood through secession. It is the job of the State
to maintain the dominant, though artificial or self-imagined, nation
because most if not all States are nationalist. 24 Into this mutually parasitic
relationship between the State and the dominant nation come minorities,
nations that are not dominant within the State in which they reside. Their
claim to autonomy may threaten both the dominant nation and, thus, the
State itself.
The practical problems involved in the concept of national autonomy for
minorities are large and vexing, even apart from the legal and administrative
complications. There is the danger that such a move will have the reverse of
the desired effect of making minorities loyal and contented citizens, espe-
cially where they are near or contiguous to the national State of their own
people-that it would disrupt and destroy the unity of States.
2 5
However, the States have agreed in international instruments to pre-
serve and promote the identity of minority groups. In sum, "[the] implica-
tion is that the State should not be conceived as a monolithic unity but as
an agency for recognizing groups, determining what legal status and rights
they shall have, supervising and coordinating their interrelationships, and
itself conducting certain kinds of functions in which all have a common
interest."
2 6
Given that the State is a legal fiction, it can accommodate a wide range
of aspirations among its population, but it is equally possible to redefine it
tal and Crowded Market, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 8, 1999, at 2; Chris Bird, Forces in Limbo
as Air War Goes On, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 18, 1999, at 4; Richard Norton-Taylor &
Martin Walker, Prospect of Split Kosovo, GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 26, 1999, at 4.
23. By protecting and enhancing the status of groups within society defined in
terms of their religion, language, culture, ethnicity, or national origins vis-d-vis Swedes
in Finland. See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Human Rights and Peoples' Rights: The Question of
Minorities, 5 NoRDIc J. HUM. RTS. 16, 21 (1987).
24. According to the inter-War Polish premier, J6zef Pilsudski, it is the State that
makes the nation, not the nation the state. See HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN EAST-
ERN EUROPE, supra note 15, at 26. The State may well legislate that certain holy days of
the dominant group's religion are to be public holidays, automatically, but usually
unconsciously, downgrading the importance of the holy days of other religions in an act
of cultural superiority. The European Court of Human Rights can be guilty of this blind-
ness, as for instance when it referred to the Mufti of Rodopi "christening children." Serif
v. Greece, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999), at 16 (emphasis added).
25. Tennent Harrington Bagley, General Principles and Problems in the International
Protection of Minorities: A Politcal Study, Ph.D Thesis for the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national Studies, Geneva, 1950, at 31 (emphasis added). See also Philip Allott, Self-
Determination: Absolute Right or Social Poetry, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION
177 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); MARKKU SUKSI, AUTONOMY: APPLICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS, (1998); STEIN ROKKAN, STATE FORMATION, NATION-BUILDING, AND MASS
POLITICS IN EUROPE: THE THEORY OF STEIN ROKKAN (Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle & Derek
Urwin eds., 1999).
26. THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 52 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Kymlicka 1996].
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with new territorial borders, and it is this fear of secession that clouds the
relationship between the State and the minority group. In the period since
the Congress of Berlin of 1878 alone, the borders of European States have
been redrawn many times.27 Nevertheless, redrawing borders is, as might
be expected, the least favored alternative in the international community
for dealing with inter-ethnic tensions. With respect to minority groups and
their needs qua the group, there are increasing references, although with
little precision, to autonomy as an alternative to secession.28 That auton-
omy can lead to the formation of new States is borne out by the experience
within the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century vis-a-vis its terri-
tories within the Balkans-Serbia, Bulgaria, Walachia, and Moldavia. 29
Thus, whether autonomy is the solution to prevent the break up of multi-
national States is, having regard to the experience of history, open to ques-
tion.30 Nevertheless, autonomy is increasingly viewed as a proper
27. For an extreme example, see PIOTR S. WANDYCZ, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM 8 (Rout-
ledge 2d ed. 2001) (1992) ("An individual born in Ungvar around 1900 grew up in the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy (more exactly in the Hungarian part) but in 1918 he found
himself to be a citizen of Czechoslovakia, his home town being called Uzhorod. In 1939,
he lived for a few days in a Carpatho-Ukrainian state to become again a Hungarian
subject. Since the Second World War, he has been a Soviet citizen. By ethnic standards
he may have been a Ukrainian, a Hungarian, a German or a Jew."). Stalinist Russia
redrew the internal borders in the former Soviet Union ("FSU") to suit minority groups
in the Caucasus. Tom Whitehouse, Blast at Russian Market Kills 56, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Mar. 20, 1999, at 15.
28. See also Kosovo-United Nations Interim Administrative Structure, Dec. 13, 1999,
available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/991213-kosovo-usial.htm.
Bernard Kouchner, former Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo,
has stated that he sees a return to the autonomy Kosovo enjoyed between 1974 and 1989
in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as the way forward. Ber-
nard Kouchner, Solution For Kosovo: The Model of 1974, United Nations Local Media
Report (May 23, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/mon/
lmm230500.html. The EU has reiterated that Kosovo is part of the FRY after the local
elections in November 2001. EU Says No to Kosovan Freedom, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 15,
2001, at 15. The fall of Milosevic heralded the possibility of a return to the pre-1989
autonomy. Martin Woollacot, Serbia Keeps Its Date With Revolution, A Decade Later,
GUARDIAN (U.K.); Oct. 6, 2000, at 5; Jeremy Hardy, Don't Thank the Bombers, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Oct. 7, 2000, at 6; Revolution, Act 2 - Milosevic's Henchmen get the Chop, GUARD-
IAN (U.K.), Oct. 10, 2000, at 14; Ewen MacAskill, Kosovo Polls Feed Separatist Fever,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 28, 2000, at 19; Ewen MacAskill, Yugoslav President 'willing to talk
to Kosovo Albanians', GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 1, 2000, at 19; Ewen MacAskill, US Shift on
Independent Kosovo Angers Allies, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 30, 2000, at 14; lan Traynor,
Storm Clouds Gather at Balkan Summit, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 25, 2000, at 13; Jonathan
Steele, EU Threat to Cut Kosovo Aid, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 24, 2001, at 14. The exclu-
sion of Kosovar Albanians from the December 2000 parliamentary elections in Serbia
might call into question whether Belgrade can legitimately claim Kosovo is part of the
FRY, although it may simply indicate an inadequate degree of co-operation from the
United Nations authorities in Pristina. Gillian Sandford, Albanians Taken Off Kosovo
Voting Lists, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 23, 2000, at 13.
29. See generally HUGH POULTON, THE BALKANS (1991); PHILIP LONGWORTH, THE MAK-
ING OF EASTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 1997); STANFORD J. SHAw & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY (1977); ALAN PALMER, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1992); BARBARA JELAVICH, HISTORY OF THE BALKANS (1983).
30. See Dietrich Murswiek, The Issue of a Right of Secession: Reconsidered, in Tomus-
chat, supra note 25, at 39. See also Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217
(Can.).
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response to meeting the needs of a group within the State, as evidenced by
the 1998 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement 31 and the establishment of
Nunavut in Canada in 1999;32 it is also seen as less drastic than secession,
the true measure of last resort, as is implicit in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession case. 33 Given that its content can
be adequately described, for law requires precision, the existence of a right
to autonomy for groups within the State could meet the need to satisfy
group claims on society whilst leaving the State intact.
II. Autonomy in International Instruments
How far has a right to autonomy been recognized in international
instruments? In the aftermath of World War 1,34 the partition of the for-
mer Empires of East Central Europe and the Balkans led to the creation of
new States with minority populations. A contemporary commentator esti-
mated that while the minority population in Central Europe was reduced
from over 50 million in the former Empires to less than 20 million in the
new States, a quarter of the "population of Jugo-Slavia, one third of that of
Roumania, two fifths of that of Czechoslovakia and well towards one half of
that of Poland consist of ethnic minorities. 35
The situation with which the Powers have now to deal is new, and experi-
ence has shown that new provisions are necessary. The territories now
being transferred both to Poland and to other States inevitably include a
large population speaking languages and belonging to races [sic] different
from that of the people with whom they will be incorporated. Unfortu-
nately, the races have been estranged by long years of bitter hostility. It is
believed that these populations will be more easily reconciled to their new
position if they know that from the very beginning they have assured protec-
tion and adequate guarantees against any danger of unjust treatment of
31. Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, supra note 5.
32. After twenty years of negotiation, Canada established a new province on April 1,
1999, Nunavut, giving self-government to 25,000 people, 85% of whom are Inuit. See
generally Nunavut Act 1993, supra note 1. See also John Aglionby, Ethnic Groups Flex
Muscles at Jakarta, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 18, 1999, at 16 (discussing the claims of
indigenous peoples within Indonesia).
33. Reference re Secession of Que., [19981 2 S.C.R. 217, 58 (Can.). See generally
Bayefsky, supra note 2.
34. For example, see the Treaty of Versailles with respect to Poland, June 28, 1919,
Cmd. 223, 22 U.K.T.S. 8 (including a letter from Clemenceau to Paderewski); Treaty of
St. Germain with Czecho-Slovakia, Sept. 10, 1919, Cmd. 479, 22 U.K.T.S. 531; Treaty of
St. Germain with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Sept. 10, 1919, Cmd. 461, 22 U.K.T.S.
543; Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, June 4, 1920, Cmd. 896, 25 U.K.T.S. 345; Treaty
of Svres with Greece, Aug. 10, 1920, Cmd. 960, 25 U.K.T.S. 329; Treaty of Lausanne
with Turkey, July 24, 1923, Cmd. 1929, 13 U.K.T.S. 533. For a full list, see Commission
on Human Rights, Study of the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities, at
2-3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/367 (1950). For pre-Word War I agreements, see Geoff Gilbert,
Religio-Nationalist Minorities and the Development of Minority Rights Law, 25 REV. INT'L
STUD. 389 (1999).
35. See generally EDMUND C. MOWER, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1931). See also
MACARTNEY, supra note 16, at 510.
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oppression. 36
The Minorities Treaties provided guarantees for these populations in
more or less standard form;37 later agreements, drawing on the develop-
ment of the League of Nations, such as the Aaland Islands agreement, 38
were not so formulaic.39 The aim of all the treaties, however, was twofold:
to guarantee equality with the majority population for the members of the
minority group, and to ensure that the minority could preserve its charac-
teristics and traditions;40 without the latter, the former amounted to little
more than assimilation. In brief, the treaties provided for the acquisition of
the nationality of the new States for all residents who so desired it, but with
an option to go to the kin-State for those not wishing to remain and become
nationals, 41 equality with the majority, the right to express their own cul-
ture, manifest their religion, speak their language, establish their own insti-
tutions.42 An equitable share of public funds for minority groups was also
provided, where the group formed a considerable proportion of the nation-
als of a town or district. 43 In some cases, however, the treaties provided for
36. Excerpted from the letter from Clemenceau to Paderewski of June 24, 1919,
which accompanied the draft Treaty of Versailles with Poland. Treaty of Versailles, supra
note 34, 1 4.
37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38. Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations approving an Agreement between
Sweden and Finland, Preserving the Language, Culture and Local Swedish Traditions of the
Population of the Aaland Islands, League of Nations Doc. C.L.110 1927, I Annex, at 16
(1921).
39. See MACARTNEY, supra note 17, at 261-263 (regarding the declarations by the
Baltic States on accession to the League of Nations). See also PABLO DE AZCARATE, LEAGUE
OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 174-177 (1945).
40. Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935 on Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.IJ.
(ser. A/B) No. 64, at 17. See also Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICUL-
TURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 32 (Charles Taylor & Amy Gutmann
eds., 1994).
41. See, e.g., Treaty of St. Germain with Czecho-Slovakia, supra note 34, art. 3.
Minority rights were for nationals of the new States; all the rights, including autono-
mous self-government where it was granted, were to be balanced by loyalty to the State.
See also Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 2, Arbitration Commission, European Com-
munity Conference on Yugoslavia, 11 January 1992, 92 INT'L. L. REP. 167, 3-4(ii);
Asbjorn Eide, Working Paper for the United Nations Working Group on Minorities: Citizen-
ship and the Minority Rights of Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.3
(1999). There does not seem to have been any consideration of the issue of dual nation-
ality. Various reasons can be advanced, such as (i) the fact that the Allies were, for the
most part, creating new States and giving them a population formed predominantly, but
not exclusively, from one 'nation,' (ii) the fear that if the minorities had the nationality
of another State this would be a destabilizing factor and, finally, (iii) because the treaties
were influenced by a draft drawn up by Jewish groups who at that time lacked a nation-
state with which to have dual nationality. MACARTNEY, supra note 16, at 212, 507-508.
In spite of the guarantee of a nationality, it proved possible to create stateless persons in
the new States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and, inevitably, these
persons tended to belong to minority groups. Id. at 507-09.
42. See, e.g., Treaty of St. Germain with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, supra note 34,
art. 7-8; Treaty of Versailles with Poland, supra note 34, art. 2; Treaty of Trianon with
Hungary, supra note 34, art. 58; Treaty of St. Germain with Czecho-Slovakia, supra note
34, art. 7-8.
43. Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey, supra note 34, art. 41.
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special rights for a particular minority population, including territorial
autonomy. The Treaty of St. Germain provides: "Czecho-Slovakia under-
takes to constitute the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians ... as an
autonomous unit within the Czecho-Slovak State, and to accord it the ful-
lest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of the Czecho-
Slovak State."4 4
The following limitation should be noted: autonomy only leads to self-
government, not to self-determination, as the concept was understood in
1919. 4 5 Self-determination in the immediate aftermath of WWI was the
process whereby the nations of the former empires in Central and Eastern
Europe were turned into States as part of the peace process. These other
nations which were part of the new States definitely had no right to seces-
sion which would have destroyed the unity of the newly created States. 46
At that time, the mix of nations within the new States was to be resolved by
the minority rights guarantees, not by self-determination in the form of a
process leading to Statehood; self-determination post-WWI was for the
Czechs and Slovaks, not for the sub-Carpathian Ruthenes.4 7 The Aaland
Islanders fared better under the agreement between the League of Nations
and Finland,4 8 but there was to be no union with Sweden. 4 9 This is not to
say the Allies were never prepared to reconsider the post-WWI borders. 50
44. Treaty of St. Germain with Czecho-Slovakia, supra note 34, art. 10.
45. See Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement,
43 INT'L. COMP. L.Q. 99, 108 (1994). President Wilson was not the first to use the term
self-determination. Cf. Valerie Epps, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination, 3 ILSAJ.
INT'L. & COMP. L. 433, 434 (1997). The "right of nations to self-determination" had
been used in Lenin's 1916 pamphlet of the same name. RICHARD SAKWA, RUSSIAN POLIT-
ICS AND SOCIETY 175 (2d ed. 1996).
46. The Ruthenians never enjoyed that autonomy, the Prague government deciding
that the population was 'backward' a contemporary commentator described them as
'amiable,' but 'both ignorant and superstitious.' MACARTNEY, supra note 16, at 519; see
also PATRICK LEIGH FERMOR, BETWEEN THE WOODS AND THE WATER (1986). The inter-War
Czech authorities also reneged on their promises to the Slovaks, giving rise to a sense of
resentment that played its part in the 1993 division of the Czech and Slovak Federative
Republic (CSFR). See R. J. CRAMPTON, EASTERN EUROPE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND
AFTER, 14-15, 66 (2d ed. 1997); ROBERT BIDELFWX & IAN JEFFRIES, A HISTORY OF EASTERN
EUROPE: CRISIS AND CHANGE, 413-418, 592-593 (1998); ROGER EAST & JOHYON PONTIN,
REVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 78, 81-83 (1997).
47. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Poland similarly incorporated East
Galicia which was predominantly Ukrainian and which had been given to Poland by the
Allies on the basis of autonomy for the local population. ROGERS BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM
REFRAMED 99-100 (1996). As for the Jews in Poland, Clemenceau had made it clear in a
letter to Paderewski accompanying the then proposed Treaty of Versailles that despite
the special guarantees regarding their religious rights, this should not create any obsta-
cle to the unity of Poland. They do not constitute any recognition of the Jews as a sepa-
rate political community within the Polish State. Letter from Clemenceau, supra note 36,
at 6 (emphasis added).
48. See generally Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, supra note 38.
49. See HANNUM 1996, supra note 13, at 29-30. See also Patrick Thornberry, The
Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with some remarks on Federalism, in
MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 107 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
50. Frederic L. KirgisJr, The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 304 (1994).
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The agreements concerning the Saar 5 ' and Upper Silesia 52 gave the popu-
lations the right to vote as to their future union with the adjoining States.
Both were special cases, but it cannot be denied that the Allies were pre-
pared to redraw borders in line with the wishes of the local population. In
the case of Upper Silesia, the League of Nations "fixed a frontier . ..
endeavoring to take into account both the municipal results of the plebi-
scite and the geographical and economic conditions of the locality."5 3
Thus, post-WWI, full political autonomy within the State was not a
general right for minority groups, it was seemingly unenforceable if politi-
cal will in the State was not present and, where granted, it was in the gift of
the Allies.54
More recently, international instruments dealing with minorities have
included concepts of autonomy. 5 5 The United Nations General Assembly
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Relig-
ious or Linguistic Minorities provides: "States shall protect the existence
and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of
minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions
for the promotion of that identity."'5 6 There is no express call for autono-
mous self-government in the 1992 Declaration, but the weak wording of
Article 1 needs to be read in the light of Article 2.3, which gives it a little
more content. Article 2.3 states: "[plersons belonging to minorities have
the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where
appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or
the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national
legislation."'5 7 Even in a General Assembly Declaration, therefore, repre-
senting only what could be agreed amongst the international community
as a whole, there is a call for minority participation and promotion of its
identity.
51. See F. P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 586-598 (1952).
52. See DE AZCARATE, supra note 39, at 137-160.
53. Id. at 139. See also Whelan, supra note 45, at 101 (citing the new border
between Germany and Denmark resulting from a plebiscite, which gave Humptrup to
Germany and Saed to Denmark).
54. See also Whelan, supra note 45, at 108-110.
55. For the moment, autonomy should be taken to mean self-government; it will be
suggested, however, that being allowed to use one's mother-tongue is a form of auton-
omy. See John Packer, On the Definition of Minorities, in THE PROTECTION OF ETHNIC AND
LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN EUROPE 23, 40-42 (John Packer & Kristian Myntti eds., 1993).
Like many other terms in this area, autonomy is undefined in international law. Given
that international law does not readily take cognizance of entities which are neither
States nor individuals, it should not be surprising that no definitions have yet emerged.
Id. at 23.
56. G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 210, U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (1993) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1992 Declaration]. See also
Asbjorn Eide, Commentary, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1998/WP.1 (1998), and
comments thereon, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.1 (1999).
57. 1992 Declaration, supra note 56, art. 8.4. ("Nothing in the present Declaration
may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of States.").
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While still not legally binding in and of itself,58 the OSCE's Copenha-
gen Document5 9 expressly notes the use by some States of autonomous
administrations for minorities meeting certain conditions:
The participating States will respect the right of persons belonging to
national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including par-
ticipation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the iden-
tity of such minorities. The participating States note the efforts undertaken
to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural,
linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establish-
ing, as one of the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or
autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and
territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the poli-
cies of the State concerned.
60
The OSCE commitments are reached on the basis of consensus and, as
such, are peculiarly appropriate for assertions of claims to autonomous
self-government; for a State to divest itself of part of its internal control
requires strong political will, more in evidence where this is a voluntary act
of State without the threat of legal enforcement procedures were it to fail to
comply. However, more important is the fact that autonomy in paragraph
35 was recognized; in amongst a series of traditional rights of minorities in
Part IV of Copenhagen, as being necessary and appropriate for some
58. See Jane Wright, The OSCE and the Protection of Minorities, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 190,
192-193 (1996). See also Arie Bloed, Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension: in Search
of its Effectiveness, in MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 51-52 (Arie Bloed et al eds.,
1993). The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) became the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on 1 January 1995-
OSCE is used throughout this article. Bloed has cast doubt on the necessity for legally
binding rights in this field, basing his view on the politically binding nature of rights
accorded by the OSCE. Id. at 51-52 citing P. van Dijk, The Final Act of Helsinki: Basis for
a Pan-European System?, 11 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 110 (1980).
The difference should not be exaggerated, as the binding force of [OSCE] com-
mitments is not seriously doubted . . . . 'A commitment does not have to be
legally binding in order to have binding force; the distinction between legal and
non-legal binding force resides in the legal consequences attached to the bind-
ing force,' not in the binding force as such. Violation of politically, but not
legally binding agreements is as unacceptable as any violation of the norms of
international law. In this respect there is no difference between politically and
legally binding rules.
Id. Furthermore, as the High Commissioner on National Minorities uses Copenhagen
standards to determine necessary changes in State practice and as States adopt such
practices as part of the international obligations, those political commitments are meta-
morphosing into customary international law. Id.; see also Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27) 183-86, 189.
59. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimen-
sion of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 11 HuM. RTs. L.J. 232 (1990) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Document]. See generally Thomas Buergenthal, The Copenhagen Document:
A New Public Order for Europe, 11 HUM. RTs. L.J. 217 (1990); Asbjorn Eide, Possible Ways
and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving
Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37, 122-55 (1992).
60. On local government as a means of better meeting the needs of minority groups,
see A. E. Dick Howard, After Communism: Devolution in Central and Eastern Europe, 40 S.
TEX. L. REv. 661, 682 (1999).
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groups.61
In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe drafted
a proposed Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 6 2 on the rights of
national minorities. 63 Article 11 provided that"[i]n the regions where they
are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have
the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authori-
ties or to have a special status matching the specific historical and territo-
rial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the State."
Again, although the provision is hedged round with limitations, if it had
been adopted it would have provided a justiciable right in minority groups
to seek autonomous government before the Strasbourg organs of the
ECHR.6 4
Neither paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document nor Article 11 of
Recommendation 1201 expressly refers to self-government; they speak of
local or autonomous administrations or authorities, which could be inter-
preted as being limited to the control of the group's own affairs. However,
such administrations and authorities are to correspond to historical or ter-
ritorial circumstances or situations. If the territorial situation were such
that in order to fully and effectively protect and promote the identity and
culture of the minority group, including its status within the State, that
group needed self-government, that is, a local or autonomous authority
over that territory, then the above two provisions would provide justifica-
tion for such an expression of internal self-determination. What is also
clear is that autonomy is not a static, uniform concept, but can vary in
content to meet the circumstances of the group.
As indicated, however, the proposed minority rights protocol to the
ECHR was rejected by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of
Europe. 65 With the demise of Recommendation 1201, the Council of
61. It builds upon recognition of internal self-determination in the Helsinki Final
Act. See infra note 157.
62. References throughout are to the 1998 version of the ECHR incorporating the
changes effected by Protocol 11. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1,
1998, Eur. T. S. No. 155 [hereinafter ECHR].
63. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Recommendation
1201 (1993) On an Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. LJ. 144 (1993) (rejected
by the Heads of State and Government Meeting) [hereinafter Recommendation 1201].
64. Article 9 of Rec. 1201 provided for an effective remedy for all the rights in the
Recommendation. Id. Eur. Parl. Ass. Deb. 22d Sess. Rec. 1201 (Feb. 1, 1993). Article
34 of the ECHR allows for applications by NGOs or groups of individuals. ECHR, supra
note 62, art. 34. See generally Geoff Gilbert, The Council of Europe and Minority Rights,
18 HUM. RTS. Q. 160 (1996); Geoff Gilbert, The Burgeoning Minority Rights Jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights, 24 HUM. RTs. Q. 736 (2002).
65. The Vienna Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of
Europe (October 1993) rejected the Assembly's draft Protocol and called only for a pro-
tocol in the cultural field to guarantee rights to individual members of minorities. Rec-
ommendation 1255 (1995) on the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities, EUR. PARL.
ASSEMB. DEB. 3D SESS. (Jan. 31, 1995). The cultural protocol has also fallen by the way-
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Europe promulgated the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities, 1995.66 It contains no provision on autonomous gov-
ernment. The Convention operates by imposing an obligation on States to
implement the various provisions within their own constitutional and legal
systems.6
7
Whereas autonomy has so far been considered in terms of minority
rights within human rights instruments, the Dayton Agreement of 1995
reasserted the sovereign status of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in Article 1 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, but created
two autonomous entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Republika Srpska.68 The Constitution, set out in Annex 4, having reiter-
ated the standard commitments to the Charter of the United Nations and
to a variety of human rights instruments in the Preamble, provides in Arti-
cle 1.3 that this sovereign Republic shall consist of the two Entities. The
Dayton Agreement shows that minority rights, may, in the eyes of the inter-
national community, require autonomous self-government. 69 Similarly,
the ultimately rejected Rambouillet Accord and the final Kosovo peace
agreement in United Nations Security Council Resolution 124470 both
side. The Parliamentary Assembly has reasserted the need for a protocol to the ECHR
on the rights of national minorities in 2001. Press Release, Council of Europe Press
Service, Assembly Calls for Stronger Minority Rights (Jan. 24, 2001), available at http://
stars.coe.int/act/compress/CPO 1/47a(01).htm.
66. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Eur. Consult.
Ass., 95th Sess., Doc. No. 157 (1995) [hereinafter Framework Convention]; Council of
Europe: Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995,
34 I.L.M. 351. See also Heinrich Klebes, The Council of Europe's Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities, 16 HUM. RTs. L.J. 92 (1995) [hereinafter Klebes
1995]; Gilbert, supra note 64, at 174.
67. The Framework Convention is very much an aspirational document. Article 15
provides: "The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation
of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in
public affairs, in particular those affecting them." Framework Convention, supra note
66, art. 15. Article 17.2 provides: "The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right
of persons belonging to national minorities to participate in the activities of non-govern-
mental organisations, both at the national and international levels." Id. art. 17.2. Some-
what unnecessarily in the circumstances, Article 21 provides: "Nothing in the present
framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activ-
ity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and in
particular of the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of
States." id. art. 21. Given that the Convention is a mere'framework for States to imple-
ment, on its own it is unlikely to lead to the United Nations Security Council having to
make a Chapter VII Resolution vis-a-vis any breakaway movement by a minority group.
68. Annex 2 to Dayton was signed by representatives of the two entities. General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75,
available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html.
69. The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement of April 10, 1998 speaks only of remain-
ing in the Union with Great Britain or of secession in order to unite with Ireland. North-
ern Ireland Peace Agreement, supra note 5, Constitutional Issues, Clause 1(i). The Belfast
Agreement: An Agreement Reached at the Multi-Party Talks on Northern Ireland, 1998,
Cm. 3883, available at http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/publications/ba.htm. See also
Geoff Gilbert, The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Minority Rights and Self-Determina-
tion, 47 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 943 (1998).
70. Resolution 1244, supra note 6, at 10-11.
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relied on autonomy for Kosovo within the FRY as a means of guaranteeing
the rights of the Kosovar Albanians.
7 1
Finally with regard to so-called minority groups in particular, the
Republic of Hungary has entered into treaties with neighbors which deal
with minority rights.72 These legally binding treaties with the Slovak
Republic 73 and Romania 74 both incorporate the rights set out in the
Copenhagen Document and Recommendation 1201, 75 neither of which,
for different reasons, has any independent legal force in its own right. Arti-
cle 15(4)(b) of the Hungaro-Slovak Treaty's reference to Recommendation
1201 as providing rights for kin-minorities, led to a delay of over a year in
the Slovak Republic's ratification, and that was only forthcoming accompa-
nied by an explanatory resolution denying any claim to collective rights or
autonomous structures. The status of this resolution shall depend on how
it is treated by Hungary. 76 The treaty with Romania, containing a similar
legalization of the norms in Recommendation 1201 and the Copenhagen
Document, was ratified more swiftly, possibly because its Annex expressly
declared that"[r]ecommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights,
nor does it impose upon [the parties] the obligation to grant to the con-
cerned persons any right to a special status of territorial autonomy based
on ethnic criteria."'7 7 Nevertheless, that declaration does not dispose of a
71. Despite the fall of Milosevic, most Kosovar Albanians do not believe the Kos-
tunica government, recognized as democratically elected in the West, will entail any
improvement of their position within the FRY. See Gillian Sandford & Own Bowcott,
Protests Break Out Across Country As Activists Smash Police Roadblocks, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Oct. 6, 2000, at 5; Julian Borger, Fervent Nationalist Stays Wary Of West, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Oct. 7, 2000, at 6; Nicholas Wood & Ian Black, UN Fears New Ethnic Clashes In
Kosovo, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 10, 2000, at 14; Jonathan Steele, Old Guard Battles To
Regain Control Of Police Force, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 11, 2000, at 17; Ewen MacAskill,
Kosovo Polls Feed Separatist Fever, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 28, 2000, at 19; Jonathan
Steele, UN Welcomes Yugoslavia And Furls Tito's Flag, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 2, 2000, at
19; lan Traynor, Storm Clouds Gather At Balkan Summit, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 25,
2000, at 13; Jonathan Steele, EU Threat To Cut Kosovo Aid, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 24,
2001, at 15. All three main parties in the local elections organized by the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) stood on a platform of
independence. Ewen MacAskill, Kosovo Moderates Oust War Heroes, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Oct. 31, 2000, at 14. The EU, however, reiterated that Kosovo was part of the FRY after
the local elections in November 2001. EU Says No To Kosovan Freedom Cry, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Nov. 20, 2001, at 15. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
72. The treaties were in response to the European Union sponsored Pact on Stability
in Europe. Pact on Stability in Europe, Mar. 20, 1995, Bull. Eur. Union, 5.
73. Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation, March. 19,
1995, Hung.-Slovk., available at http://www.htmh.hu/dokumentumok/asz-sk-e.htm. See
Jane Wright, The Protection of Minority Rights in Europe: From Conference to Implementa-
tion, 2 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1998).
74. Treaty on Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighborliness, Sep. 16,
1996, Hung.-Rom., 36 I.L.M. 340 (1997).
75. Copenhagen Document, supra note 59; Recommendation 1201, supra note 63.
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
77. See Copenhagen Document, supra note 59, at 35. It is arguable that paragraph
35 only provides for an autonomous administration in order to "protect and create con-
ditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity" of
minority groups, that is, cultural autonomy. Id. However, the second paragraph needs
to be read into the first paragraph, where the State undertakes "to respect the right of
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legal right under the bilateral treaty to autonomy based on paragraph 35 of
the Copenhagen Document.
Indigenous peoples assert that they should not be treated as minori-
ties, that they are a discrete group entity within international law.78 Never-
theless, there is nothing to stop them from benefiting from minority rights
guarantees, although the converse is not true vis-d-vis minority groups. The
change in tenor of the ILO Conventions on Indigenous Peoples between
No. 107 of 1957 and No. 169 of 1989 is noteworthy as regards recognition
of the collectivity. As Galenkamp observes, the earlier convention was con-
cerned with the assimilation into the rest of the population of individual
members of indigenous groups as they 'became civilized,' whereas No.169
seeks to preserve the "integrity and identity of those communities. Hence,
the 'individualistic' approach has made way for a 'collectivist' approach
which gives priority to the preservation of the traditional group identity."79
Moreover, the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples8 ° provides for an independent right to autonomy, defined
for these purposes as self-government:
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-deter-
mination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating
to their internal and local affairs, including culture, religion, education,
information, media, health, housing, employment, social welfare, economic
activities, land and resources management, environment and entry by non-




Thus, while the details have not been fully worked out, there is a growing
recognition in international instruments dealing with minorities and indig-
enous peoples that the instruments should include the possibility of auton-
persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs." Id.
Taken as a whole, paragraph 35 would support a claim to autonomous self-government
in appropriate territorial circumstances. Id.
78. See Prevention of Discrimination against and the Protection of Minorities, U.N.
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52d Sess., Agenda
Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/1O (2000) (Working paper on the relationship
and distinction between the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indig-
enous peoples prepared by Ms. Erika-Irene Daes and Mr. Asbjorn Eide). See also Bene-
dict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples'
Claims in International and Comparative Law, in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 69 (Philip Alston ed.,
2001).
79. Marlies Galenkamp, Collective Rights, SIM Special No. 16, 1995, at 74-75, availa-
ble at http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/specials/no-16/16-3.pdf (Report commis-
sioned by the Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy of the
Netherlands).
80. Draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/SUB.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration on Indigenous
Peoples].
81. For the creation of Nunavut, see the Nunavut Act, supra note 1, § 79(1); 0 garan-
tiiakh pray korennykh malochislennykh naro-dov Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Russian Federal
Law 'On Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Small-in-Number Peoples of the Russian
Federation'], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 82-FZ, art. 11 (on territorial social self-rule.
I am grateful to Bill Bowring for a summary of this law).
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omy in the form of self-government for appropriate groups within the State.
However, it is those details that will provide the substance of this so-called
right; at present, one is seeking to accord to 'minorities' a right to 'auton-
omy', and both concepts are undefined.
The principle of autonomy evidently depends for its practicability and value
on the historical, ethnic, linguistic, and psychological factors involved in
each situation. The proposition of autonomy as a solution to the 'minorities
problem' in general is of course unjustified and impractical. It is far too
facile to simple [sic] point to Switzerland and say to the national States to
'study her institutions and follow the good example.' Switzerland's institu-
tions are a result of a specific set of historical circumstances based on a large
number of complex factors. Political institutions taken separate [sic] from
the practical conditions in which they are to apply are meaningless. It is
perfectly true that certain of today's minorities problems might best be
solved by autonomy, but it could only be applied as the result of a profound
knowledge of the specific conditions involved. . . . [The] potential dangers
and disadvantages of the principle [of autonomy] must be weighed against
the advantages it offers.8 2
These concerns, however, stem from an understanding of autonomy as
regional self-government. If autonomy is accorded a wider range of inter-
pretations, as is discussed below, then its applicability to the situation of
groups within the State in general will become more apparent. What is
clear beyond doubt from all the above, however, is that it would be possible
to incorporate a legal right to autonomy for a minority group in a treaty if
the States parties were so minded.
III. Autonomy and Self-Determination
In the absence of a universal minority rights treaty, which incorpo-
rates a right to autonomy, could the right to self-determination provide the
route to autonomy for minority groups? The traditional view of self-deter-
mination is of external self-determination, the right for the peoples of the
State to determine how the State will be run without external interfer-
ence.8 3 Alongside, there developed the concept of internal self-determina-
tion that all the peoples within the State ought to be part of the process of
State governance.8 4 Koskenniemi shows that self-determination both but-
82. Bagley, supra note 25, at 31 (emphasis added). On the Swiss system see Lidija
Fleiner, La Suisse, un Etat Multicultural (May 1998) (paper presented to the Working
Group on Minorities) (on file with author). See also Kymlicka 1995, supra note 9, at 1.
83. United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on
Friendly Relations]. See also James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in Interna-
tional Law: its Development and Future, in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 7 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).
84. See Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION 225 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Jean Salmon, Internal Aspects of the Right to
Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle, in id. at 253. See also Ian
Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 255 Hague
Recueil 9, 55-61 (1995); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 101 (1995). On the democratic process and the rights of minority groups,
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tresses the State by acknowledging that peoples have the right freely to
determine their political status without external interference and that
endows State acts with legal validity, while on the other hand, it provides a
challenge to the formal structures of Statehood.8 5 "[It explains that State-
hood per se embodies no particular virtue and that even as it is useful as a
presumption about the authority of a particular territorial rule, that pre-
sumption may be overruled or its consequences modified in favor of a
group or unit finding itself excluded from those positions of authority in
which the substance of the rule is determined." 86
The link between autonomy and self-determination has already been
seen in Article 31 of the 1994 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples.8 7 Autonomy mirrors aspects of both concepts of self-deter-
mination; it recognizes the right of all peoples freely to determine the
future of the State through democratic self-governance,88 for the State can
delegate competences to other organs within its 'space,' 8 9 while it can also
enhance the semi-detached nature of some of those peoples within the
State. That still, however, does not provide a right to autonomy for minori-
ties; what is increasingly certain, though, is that for some minority groups,
mere recognition of the individual human rights of the members of that
group will not suffice to meet their needs or demands. 90
Gros Espiell, in his study of self-determination, 9 1 argued that at the
time of writing, almost twenty years ago, that self-determination was a
see Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 64-69 (Can.). On the difference
between governance and government, see Paul Hirst & Grahame Thompson, Globaliza-
tion and the Future of the Nation State, 24 ECON. & Soc'Y 408, 422 (1995). See also
GREGORY H. Fox & BRAD R. ROTH, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAl. LAW 340
(2000).
85. Drawing on the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 83, Principle V
(The Principle of Equal Rights and the Self-Determination of Peoples).
86. Koskenniemi, supra note 18, at 248-249. Koskenniemi goes on to describe these
two facets of self-determination as "Hobbesean" and "Rousseauesque." Id. at 249-250.
In this paper, internal self-determination is the principal topic of concern, since the
focus is on the inclusion of all groups within society in the governance of the State.
Ignatane v. Latvia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. II, at
191, U.N. Doc. A/56/40 (2001) (held that barring a member of the Russian minority
from standing in local elections on the ground that her proficiency in Latvian was not
adequate, despite the fact that a State approved test three years earlier had given her the
highest grade, violated Articles 25 and 2 of the ICCPR: she had been "prevented from
exercising her right to participate in public life." Id. at 7.4.).
87. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 80, art. 31.
88. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L
L. 46, 52 (1992); MARKS, supra note 12, at 37; Fox & ROTH, supra note 86, at 25.
89. CARTY, supra note 17, at 5.
90. Which is not to say that those individual human rights can be disregarded.
Hurst Hannum, Contemporary Developments in the International Protection of the Rights of
Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1447 (1991) [hereinafter Hannum 1992].
91. The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, at
42-45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980) (study prepared by Hector Gros
Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities).
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right of peoples under colonial and alien domination.92 The right to self-
determination was established through a variety of United Nations resolu-
tions and other documents. 9 3 In the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the right is granted to all
peoples by virtue of which they can freely determine "their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."9 4 It is
possible for self-determination to be pursued other than through secession,
for example through union with another State, but with regard to peoples
under colonial or alien domination secession was the preferred solution.
However, Gros Espiell's study also makes clear that in focusing on peoples
under colonial or alien domination, he was not exhausting all elements of
the right to self-determination. 95 The study did expressly exclude minori-
ties, but made it clear that the law could develop to give them, too, the right
to self-determination. On the other hand, Hannum writing in 1992 still
averred that no non-colonial people "had yet acquired the right to indepen-
dence or self-determination in international law."96 However, Hannum
was confining the right to self-determination to independence from the
State, which leaves open the question as to whether other modes of imple-
mentation might be open to non-colonial peoples, and, as demonstrated
previously, Brownlie argues that the distinction between peoples and
minorities is, in fact, otiose.9 7
What is still left unclear, therefore, is: (i) whether non-colonial peoples
and those not under alien domination can assert a right to self-determina-
tion at all; (ii) whether, if so, self-determination extends to the different
peoples, including minority groups, within a State as opposed to the peo-
ples of the State as a whole, implicitly granting a right to secede; and (iii)
whether, in the alternative, less drastic forms of self-determination, such as
autonomy, are available to such other peoples within the State where
colonialism and alien domination are not in issue?
A. Has Self-Determination a Role Beyond Decolonization? 98
Higgins has argued that self-determination as set out in the United
Nations Charter was never intended to be the basis of a right to decoloniza-
tion, let alone that it should develop into a general right for individual
92. Cf. MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE NEW Doc-
TRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 63-72 (1982) (arguing that even for those under colonial
or alien domination there is no legal right to self-determination). That view was deci-
sively rejected by the ICJ in the East Timor case, 1995 I.CJ. 90, at 29.
93. See Gros Espiell, supra note 91, 48.
94. Declaration on the Granting of Independence, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 15 (1960).
95. Gros Espiell, supra note 91, 56.
96. Hannum 1992, supra note 90, at 48-49. Cf. Hurst Hannum Rethinking, infra
note 110. See also Article 5 of the 1995 Nicaraguan Constitution, cited in Tom Hadden
& Ciaran 0 Maoldin, Integrative Approaches to the Accommodation of Minorities, Appen-
dix n. 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/CRP.9 (2001).
97. Brownlie, supra note 9, at 16. Cf. MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at 172-77.
98. See Epps, supra note 45, at 435-36.
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groups within a State.9 9 However, whereas the 1960 Declaration on the
Granting of Independence' 0 0 referred to peoples solely within a context of
decolonization, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relationsto1 was not so
restricted. The section on 'The principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples' links self-determination with the upholding of fundamen-
tal human rights. 10 2 During debates in the drafting stage, views were
expressed that since it was a right of all peoples, 10 3
Il]n exceptional case, peoples living, for example, in a region geographically
distinct and ethnically and culturally different from the rest of a State's terri-
tory, should be allowed, with appropriate safeguards, to exercise their right
to self-determination. 10 4
The final version of the 1970 Declaration included a clause which
attempted to construe the principle as not "authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States."10 5 Thus,
on this understanding, minorities within a State would not have a right to
self-determination in terms of secession, only those groups suffering colo-
nial domination or alien subjugation. However, that limitation on self-
determination in the Declaration only applies to States "conducting them-
selves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as
to race creed or colour."106 Furthermore, in the 1974 Resolution on the
Definition of Aggression, it was reaffirmed that nothing in that Resolution
could be taken to prejudice the right to self-determination of peoples, "par-
ticularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination."' 0 7 Self-determination, thus, is not confined to the particular
situation of those under colonial or alien domination, which is merely a
specific example. Indeed, at the World Conference on Human Rights held
in Vienna in 1993, the disclaimer from the 1970 Declaration relating to
99. Rosalyn Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, Comments, in
PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Catherine Br6lmann et al. eds.,
1993). Which is not to deny that Higgins recognizes the responsive nature of interna-
tional law. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT (1994).
100. Declaration on the Granting of Independence, supra note 94, 9 2.
101. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 83, at 121.
102. Id. Although this principle is also said to be implemented in order to bring a
speedy end to colonialism.
103. No one has ever provided a conclusive definition of peoples or a people. See
Robert McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 857, 866-68 (1994); cf. Brownlie, supra note 9, at 5, 16; MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at
148-67.
104. Aureliu Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Devel-
opment on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, at 63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/
Rev.1 (1981).
105. Id. at 279.
106. Id.
107. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art. 7, cited in 69
AM. J. INT'L L. 480 (1975).
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territorial integrity and political unity was reiterated, but with the qualifica-
tion now being that the government of the State must represent the whole
people without distinction of any kind if it is to have the benefit of that dis-
claimer.10 8 Thus, with respect to international instruments, self-determi-
nation should be available to groups in a State where the government does
not represent the "whole people without distinction."
It might also be argued that common Article 1 of the International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights provides support for a non-colonial application of the right of self-
determination.
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-
tional economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit,
and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Terri-
tories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and
shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations. 10
9
Nevertheless, Hannum has convincingly shown that the drafters of the
Covenants viewed self-determination in Article 1 as solely a right relating
to situations of colonial or alien domination. 110 However, the Human
Rights Committee in its 1984 General Comment on Article 1, observed
that all States, not just those with colonies, have reporting obligations vis-a-
vis Article 1 rights. "Article 1 enshrines an inalienable right-of all peoples
as described in its paragraphs 1 and 2. By virtue of that right they freely
'determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.' The Article imposes on all States parties corre-
sponding obligations."11 While confining self-determination to a right of
all peoples within the State, and not any particular people, except possibly
108. United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, 32 I.L.M. 1670 (1993); 14 HUM. RTs. I.J. 352 (1993). See also G.A.
Res. 50/6, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/49 (1995). See Kirgis,
supra note 50, at 306 (emphasis added). See also, Franck 1996, supra note 12, at 382;
Mortimer, supra note 9, at 24. Cf. Fox & ROTH, supra note 84, at 94; Hurst Hannum,
The Specter of Secession, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 13 (1998) [hereinafter Hannum 1998].
109. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. X
(1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]. G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 490 [hereinafter ICESCR].
110. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 23, 23-24
(1993) [hereinafter Hannum Rethinking]; cf. Rosas in Tomuschat, supra note 84, at
241-46.
111. General Comment 12, Article 1, Human Rights Committee, 21st Sess. (1984),
reprinted in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc.HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 121 (2001)
[hereinafter HRC General Comment 12(21)]. See also General Recommendation XXI on
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in one particular case discussed below, it still reinforces the view that self-
determination as a human right is applicable to all peoples, not just those
under colonial or alien domination.1 1 2 Furthermore, at paragraph 6, the
General Comment provides that "all States parties to the Covenant should
take positive action to facilitate realization of and respect for the right of
peoples to self-determination."' 13 Although paragraph 6 deals with Article
1.3, this approach to the right to self-determination as something the State
must take steps to facilitate, must apply to every case, including internal
self-determination for each people constituting the "peoples" of the State.
As Steiner makes clear, self-determination can interfere with the implemen-
tation of human rights in a manner that is not a simple balancing of two
different human rights; self-determination operates in such a way as to
affect the very structure of human rights guarantees for persons within the
self-determining regime.1 14 Self-determination is both a human right and
a way to preserve human rights, for it is a continuing process.
115
That self-determination has an internal aspect can also be inferred
from the fact that according to paragraph 6 of the HRC's General Comment
on Article 1, States have to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of
other States, "thereby adversely affecting the exercise of the right to self-
determination." 116 Furthermore, the 1970 Declaration also holds that self-
determination might be implemented not only through the establishment
of a sovereign and independent State, but by the emergence into any other
political status "freely determined by a people" indicating the possibility
that an autonomous government within the State for that people would be
an acceptable form of self-determination and one pertinent to certain
minority groups.
The case law of the ICJ on self-determination was initially restricted to
cases of colonialism or alien domination." 7 In the Namibia case,'1 8 the
ICJ affirmed the principle of self-determination for non-self governing ter-
Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (1996) (giving a more traditional
analysis by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination).
112. See Franck, supra note 88, at 59; see also Preamble to the Protocol of San Salva-
dor, OAS Treaty Series No. 69 (1988) 6:
Bearing in mind that, although fundamental economic, social and cultural
rights have been recognized in earlier international instruments of both world
and regional scope, it is essential that those rights be reaffirmed, developed,
perfected and protected in order to consolidate in America, on the basis of full
respect for the rights of the individual, the democratic representative form of
government as well as the right of its peoples to development, self-determina-
tion, and the free disposal of their wealth and natural resources.
113. Id. at 6.
114. HenryJ. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes
for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539 (1991), abstracted in HENRY J. STEINER &
PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAl. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1272 (2d ed. 2000).
115. Cf. McCorquodale, supra note 103, at 875-85.
116. HRC General Comment 12(21), supra note 111, 6.
117. See generally Crawford, supra note 9.
118. Advisory Opinion No. 53, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, 1971 I.CJ. 16 (1970).
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ritories, a decision generally interpreted as giving a right to self-determina-
tion for colonies. 119 This view of the Namibia case was endorsed in the
ICJ's Advisory Opinion in the Western Sahara case, 1 20 where the Court
held the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression
of the will of the peoples concerned. Judge Dillard, in a separate concur-
ring opinion, held that for the purposes of the present proceedings, the
Court was "forthright in proclaiming the existence of a 'right."121 In the
East Timor case, Portugal alleged that by entering into an agreement with
Indonesia re the Timor Gap, Australia had infringed the right of the people
of East Timor to self-determination and the powers of Portugal as adminis-
tering Power of the Non-Self Governing Territory of East Timor.12 2 The ICJ
rejected Portugal's claim, but stated that the assertion that the right of peo-
ples to self-determination had an erga omnes character was irreproacha-
ble. 1 2 3 None of those cases, however, can be taken to endorse a general
right to self-determination in situations not concerned with decolonization
and alien domination. 1 24 In the Crime of Genocide case, 12 5 though, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia raised a Preliminary Objection "that, by its
acts relating to its accession to independence, the Republic of Bosnia-Her-
zegovina had flagrantly violated the duties stemming from the 'principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.' According to Yugoslavia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina was not, for this reason, qualified to become a party to
the Genocide Convention.' 1 2 6 Moreover, the dissenting opinion of Ad Hoc
Judge Kreca makes constant reference to self-determination having been
denied to the Serb population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus invalidating a
claim to Statehood and accession to the Genocide Convention. 12 7 How-
119. Id. at 31-32; cf. POMERANCE, supra note 92, at 69.
120. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.CJ. 12, 55 (1975). The Polisario
Front, the group fighting for independence in Western Sahara and formerly regarded as
Marxist, reaffirmed its 1991 acceptance of a democratic system of elections upon inde-
pendence as the United Nations mandate drew to an end. John Hooper, The Polisario's
Marxist Past Sinks into the Desert Sands, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 11, 1999, at 14.
121. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion 1975 I.C.J. 12, 116-26 (Dillard, J.,
dissenting).
122. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. AustI.), 1995 I.CJ. 90 (June 30); 34 I.L.M.
1581, 10 (1995). On non-self-governing territories, see Chapter XI of the United
Nations Charter and G.A. Res.1541 (XV), 15 December 1960, Principles VI-IX, cited in
Tomuschat, supra note 25, at 286.
123. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.CJ. 90, at 29. On the
customary character of the 1970 Declaration, see Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27), 188-205, 228. Whether the decision extends
to the whole of the Declaration is debatable, but there are sufficient other indicia of the
customary nature of self-determination.
124. East Timor seems to have been treated by the ICJ as the final fulfillment of its
decolonization from Portugal in the 1970s, not as a case of independence from Indone-
sia. See also Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal
Focus, 16 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 733 (1995), abstracted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 114, at
1272.
125. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.-Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 1.C.J. 595 (July 11) [herein-
after Crime of Genocide Case].
126. Id. at 604; cf. Badinter Commission Opinion No. 2, supra note 41, at 167.
127. Crime of Genocide Case, 1996 I.CJ. 595, at 6, 9, 11, 16, 26.
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ever, the ICJ summarily rebutted the Preliminary Objection by simply refer-
ring to Bosnia-Herzegovinabecoming a member of the United Nations by
decisions of the General Assembly and Security Council on 22 May 1992.
It needs to be noted that it did not refute the objection by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia on the ground that this was not a colonial situation.
Had self-determination applied only to situations of colonialism and alien
domination, surely the ICJ would have felt compelled expressly to reject the
objection for this reason. What is important about this decision, therefore,
is that self-determination was treated as a potentially relevant factor by the
ICJ in a non-colonial situation.
Finally, if self-determination were to be limited to colonialism or alien
domination, one would be focusing on the dominant group rather than
upon those to whom the right is accorded. Should externally imposed bor-
ders and alien domination in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans,
therefore, be treated any differently from those in Africa, for example?128
Following the tearing down of the Iron Curtain, the break-up of the FSU
and the former Yugoslavia have been accepted by the international commu-
nity, although the question as to whether that was part of a right to self-
determination on the part of the various population groups admittedly
remains undecided.' 29
Therefore, given that it is accepted, on the weight of law and practice
considered above, that self-determination is available beyond situations of
decolonization, the next question is whether it is a right for all the peoples
within the State as a whole or whether it attaches to each individual people.
One possible consequence of self-determination for each individual people
would be to recognize a right of secession in situations of quasi-alien domi-
nation from within the State, although secession is not the only tenable
interpretation of the right to self-determination. To answer the question of
whether it might attach to an individual people where decolonization and
alien domination were not in issue, one would need to determine when
self-determination for 'all peoples' within a State was not being accorded,
and where some of those peoples were not being incorporated within the
whole, whether they could then form their own State. On the other hand,
it may be that in situations beyond decolonization, secession is not an
acceptable form of self-determination.
B. Self-Determination-Simply a Right to Secede? 130
McGarry and O'Leary 13 1 have analyzed the methods used by States
for 'eliminating' and 'managing' different groups. One method they list for
128. See POMERANCE, supra note 92, at 37.
129. See Fox, supra note 124, at 138. Eritrea has also been recognized, but again after
the event. See Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal
Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995).
130. See Allen Buchanan, The Morality of Secession, in Kymlicka 1996, supra note 26,
at 350.
131. John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, Introduction: The Macro-Political Regulation
Of Ethnic Conflict, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION 3 (1993).
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'eliminating' the minority group is to grant it secession. 1 32 Of course, to
achieve that end the group has to have a connection, current and historical,
to a definable territory. 133 On this test, therefore, non-territorial groups
within a State could never aspire to secession. 1 3 4 Murswiek has argued
that a right of secession arises for a group with a definable territory where
it is in the majority and its fundamental human rights, evidently and
severely, are being violated.135 The State is obliged to preserve the
group, 136 if the latter is to achieve self-determination of any kind. Where
the State seeks to destroy the group, then self-determination for the group
may give rise to a right to secession, it might even be viewed as a form of
self-defense against aggression. 13 7
[The] fundamental condition of self-determination must be respected by all
States. A State that infringes this obligation cannot pit the principle of sov-
ereignty or of territorial integrity against the people's right to secession.
There must, at least, be a right of secession if it does not seem possible to
save the existence of a people, which is the holder of a right of self-determi-
nation in a certain territory, except by secession from the existing State. 13 8
Kirgis13 9 adopts a similar line. He builds on the disclaimer in the
1970 Declaration' 40 that territorial integrity and political unity could not
be impaired by self-determination where the State was "conducting [itself]
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government represent-
132. Alternatives for the State include genocide and assimilation. For the State, the
principal question may not be whether there is a right to secession, but how to best deal
with this discrete group. See also Stavenhagen, supra note 23, at 21; Asbjorn Eide, Com-
mentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Relig-
ious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/WP.1 (2000), at 4
(dealing with art. 1.1). According to Kymlicka, with respect to the United States, "a
deliberate decision was made not to accept any territory as a state [within the United
States] unless these national groups were outnumbered." Kymlicka 1996, supra note 26,
at 28. In 1918, Theodore Roosevelt said: "Every immigrant who comes here should be
required within five years to learn English or leave the country." BILL BRYSON, MADE IN
AMERICA 143 (Morrow 1994). While there were concentrations of various ethnic groups
in different parts of the United States, the desire to integrate meant that English was the
first language within a generation. See H. L. Mencken, The American Language
(Abridged), cited in BRYSON, supra at 142.
133. See Brilmayer, supra note 17, at 179. It would be a matter of degree as to how
precisely similar the past and current territories would need to be.
134. The Fifth World Congress of the International Union Romani called for non-
territorial nationhood for the Roma at its meeting in Prague in July 2000, reflecting the
need for recognition as a nation if the developing jurisprudence on self-rule were to
apply to the Roma peoples. Kate Connolly, Europe's Gypsies Lobby for Nation Status,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 28, 2000, at 14; Gary Younge, A Nation is Born: Europe and Race:
Gypsies Defence Against Extremism as Germans Wring their Hands, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July
31, 2000, at 15.
135. Dietrich Murswiek, The Issue of a Right of Secession: Reconsidered, in Tomuschat,
supra note 25, at 27.
136. 1992 Declaration, supra note 56.
137. See 1974 Resolution, supra note 107, art. 7.
138. Murswiek, supra note 135, at 27.
139. Kirgis, supra note 50, at 305.
140. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 83, Principle V.
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ing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction [of any
kind]."1 4 1 On this basis, he argues that where any State is not providing
internal self-determination through non-discriminatory representative gov-
ernment 4 2 for all its peoples, then an excluded group within that State
could secede. 1 43 Epps i 44 is also prepared to find that groups within States
which are not under colonial or alien domination could, in appropriate
circumstances, secede.' 4 5 The Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec
Secession case by implication accepted, obiter, that where "a people is
blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination
internally," then it could secede.' 4 6 While NATO's campaign against the
FRY was commenced with the intent of forcing Belgrade to grant autonomy
to Kosovo, the human rights violations perpetrated by the Yugoslav army
during its program of ethnic cleansing were so gross that it was subse-
quently decided that only international protectorate status would suffice,
with the possible implication of eventual independence for Kosovo. t 4 7
141. As reinterpreted in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and quoted in Kirgis, supra note
50, at 305-06. The Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession case held that the
people of Quebec had unparalleled access to the governance of Canada such that they
could not claim that Canada was not possessed of "a government representing the whole
people who belong to the territory without distinction" and, on that reasoning, that they
had no right to self-determination. Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217,
135-36 (Can.).
142. Representative government is the necessary consequence of internal self-deter-
mination and is not a new addition to the already accepted right. See Packer, supra note
55, at 27-42; Ignatane v. Latvia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., Supp. No.
40, Vol. II, at 191, U.N. Doc. A/56/40, 7.4.
143. Kirgis, supra note 50, at 305-06 (considering other forms of self-determination).
See also Hannum 1998, supra note 108, at 16-17; Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting Self-Determi-
nation as an International Law Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era, 3
ILSA J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 443, 452 (1997); cf. Reference re Secession of Que., 119981 2
S.C.R. 217, 135-36 (Can.). De Varennes has provided evidence of the link between lin-
guistic or ethnic discrimination and ethnic conflict. Minority Rights and the Prevention
of Ethnic Conflicts, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/CRP.3 (2000).
144. Epps, supra note 45, at 437-39.
145. Epps also believes that fully represented groups in democratic States will have
the right to secede if they have claims to territory. Id. at 442. The terms in which she
describes this 'right' makes it more akin to a privilege within the grant of the State.
146. Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 133-39- (Can.). See also
Lauri Hannikainen, Kosovo: Autonomy or Independence?, 7:1 OSCE REVIEw 3 (1999).
147. U.N. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 6, at 10-11 (Preamble discusses autonomy for
Kosovo). The fall of former President Milosevic reduces the likelihood that indepen-
dence for Kosovo would be endorsed by the international community. Derek Brosn, A
New Pilot in Europe's Cockpit, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 6, 2000, at 5; lan Black & Nicholas
Wood, UN Fears New Ethnic Clashes in Kosovo, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 10, 2000, at 14;
Richard Norton-Taylor, Kosovo Security is NATO's Priority, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 11,
2000, at 17; Paddy Ashdown, After the Revolution, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 14, 2000, at 21;
John Gray, Between Dubya and the Deep Blue Sea, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 1, 2000, at 19;
John Steele, EU Threat to Cut Kosovo Aid, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 24, 2001, at 15; George
Galloway, Harbingers of Death in the Gulf, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 20, 2001 at 15.
Reports, on the one hand, from a commission established by the Swedish prime minister
and, on the other, by the International Crisis Group suggest that Kosovo should still
obtain a measure of independence after Milosevic's removal from office. INDEPENDENT
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 9-10 (2000); Jonathan Steele, Give Kosovo Independence or
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However, with the potential exception of Kosovo, there is little practi-
cal evidence to support such claims.' 48 Even where the ICJ considered
self-determination beyond decolonization in the Crime of Genocide case, it
rebutted the claim of the Bosnian Serbs and, if anything, recognized the
claim of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole to self-determination from the for-
mer Yugoslavia. 14 9 The new States of the 1990s owe more to territorial
coherence and ex post facto recognition of the State than any former dis-
crimination against a particular ethnic group or nation within some larger
'former' State. 1 50 Beyond decolonization, there appears to be no right to
secession that can be supported on the basis of international law and prac-
tice. 15 1 Indeed, the much-vaunted 1970 Declaration, ultimately on which
rests the claim to a general right to secession beyond decolonization, pro-
vides that "the territorial integrity or political unity" of States shall not be
dismembered or impaired subject only to the requirement of participatory
democracy. While secession is the preferred option for decolonization,
Face Fresh Conflict, UN is Told, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 23, 2000, at 17; Mark Kaldor, Time
to be Constructive, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 24, 2000, at 20. See also Richard Goldstone &
Carl Tham, Why Conditional Independence, INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
Kosovo, Nov. 2001, available at http://www.kosovocommission.org/reports/followup.
html; Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, Aug. 2001,
available at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF Reports/KOSOVO in Limbo.pdf. Martin
Woolacott, There is a Dangerous Lack of Clarity on Kosovo's Future, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Nov. 9, 2001, at 18. The United States government has also indicated that indepen-
dence is not impossible post-Milosevic. Ewen MacAskiill, US Shift on Independent
Kosovo Angers Allies, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 30, 2000, at 14. Moreover, the Kosovar Alba-
nian population still wants independence despite the change in Belgrade. Kosovo's High
Hopes, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 31, 2000, at 14. The status of Kosovo was discussed at the
fifth anniversary review of the discussed at the fifth anniversary review of the Dayton
Peace Accords. Gillian Sandford, Kostunica Courts Serbia's Old Foes, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Nov. 17, 2000, at 18; Also, regular summits were held between Balkan leaders and EU
officials. John Steele, EU Threat to Cut Kosovo Aid, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 24, 2001, at
15. The Secretary-General's former Special Representative in Kosovo, Bernard Koucher,
has also indicated that Kosovo's status with respect to the FRY cannot be treated as
'solved' by the succession of Kostunica and President Djukanovic of Montenegro stated
that its international protectorate status will have to last for a considerable time to come.
Ian Traynor, Storm Clouds Gather at Balkan Summit, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 25, 2000, at
13. On protectorate status and its consequences, see Thomas Baty, Protectorates and
Mandates, 1921-22 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 109; Treaty of Friendship between India and
Bhutan, 1949, 157 B.F.S.P. 214; U.N. CHARTER, Chapter XI, arts. 74-74. See also JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (1979). Additionally, the
4-1 vote for independence rather than autonomy in the East. Timor referendum on
August 30, 1999 was a result of the behavior of the Indonesian security forces over the
past quarter century. Ian Black, UN Knows it Must Do Something- But What?, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Sept. 4, 1999, at 1. Having been occupied by Indonesia after Portugal ended its
colonial rule in 1975, East Timor does not provide a valid example of independence as
part of self-determination in the post-colonial era-it is sui generis.
148. Hannum 1998, supra note 108, at 13-14. The Supreme Court of Canada held
Quebec had no right to secede in international law. Reference re Secession of Que.,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 138 (Can.). See generally Bayefsky, supra note 2.
149. Crime of Genocide Case, 1996 I.C.J. 595, at 19.
150. See, e.g., wa Mutua, supra note 129, at 113. See also Opinion No. 3, Conference
on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, 92 I.L.R. 170 (Arbitration Comm'n 1992).
151. See HANNUM 1996, supra note 13, at 46; cf. Reference re Secession of Que.,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at 139 (with respect to the "aboriginal peoples" of Quebec) (Can.).
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self-determination has never been so limited. Beyond decolonization, self-
determination may be satisfied through "emergence into any other political
status freely determined."'152 The focus of self-determination should be
people, not territory.' 53 Moreover, according to the 1970 Declaration, that
status is to be determined freely by a people, so it is implicit that self-
determination is not confined to a right for all peoples within the State and
can be utilized for any group within a State whicti is not being allowed to
participate fully in the polity.
C. Non-colonial Peoples and Other Forms of Self-Determination' 5 4
Self-determination, as has been seen, is broader than mere secession
and can be enjoyed within the State; 155 it is a lesser interference by interna-
tional human rights law in the internal status of a State to provide a right
to autonomy than to provide for secession.156 The Helsinki Final Act of
1975 expressly recognizes the right to internal self-determination.' 57
Where the right to participate as part of self-determination is denied, then
one can posit a right to negotiated autonomy.' 5l Kirgis has provided a
taxonomy of self-determination,' 59 including a right to autonomy, "as in
autonomous areas within confederations," and minority rights as estab-
lished in Article 27 of the ICCPR.' 6° To incorporate Article 27 within the
152. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 83, Principle V, 4. See also Otto Kimminich, A 'Fed-
eral' Right of Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 25,
at 83; Thornberry, supra note 49, at 133-34.
153. See Hannum 1998, supra note 108, at 15.
154. See Asbjorn Eide, In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession, in MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 49, at 139. Tom Hadden & Kevin Boyle, Internal
Power-Sharing, Externally Shared Authority and Inter-Governmental Co-operation, 22:2
ETUDES IRLANDAISES 37 (1997). The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement of April 1998
offers union with the United Kingdom or Ireland, but not independent status because
that would be inappropriate on the facts. Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, supra note
5.
155. Indeed, internal self-determination is a continuing process for all States. "With
regard to paragraph 1 of Article 1, State parties should describe the constitutional and
political processes which in practice allow the exercise of this right." HRC General Com-
ment 12(21), supra note 111, 4 (emphasis added). See also Rosas, supra note 84, at 225;
Karl Doehring, Self-Determination as ius cogens, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A COMMENTARY 70 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994); Antonio Cassese, Political Self-Determina-
tion: Old Concepts and New Developments, in UN LAW/ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: Two TopIcs
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMI-
NATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 47, 101 (1995).
156. See Opinion No. 2, supra note 41, 1.
157. Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Helsinki Final Act, August
1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292.
158. Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 134 (Can.). NATO govern-
ments were prepared to use force to compel Belgrade to grant autonomy to Kosovo. The
threat was that force would be used, inter alia, if there were no good faith negotiations
with the implicit obligation to achieve some greater autonomy than currently existed.
See Res. 1160, supra note 22; Res. 1199, supra note 22; Res. 1203, supra note 22.
159. Kirgis, supra note 50, at 307, particularly points (6) and (7). See also McGarry
& O'Leary, supra note 131, at 23-38 (taxonomy of methods listed for managing
minorities).
160. On minority rights, see PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS
OF MINORITIES 141 (1991); see also Gilbert 1996, supra note 64, at 170.
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definition of self-determination under Article 1 is to conjoin two separate
rights for two different types of beneficiary; Article 27 is for individual
members of minority groups, not for the group as a collective. 16 1 While
entitlement to Articles 1 and 27 is not mutually exclusive, that does not
entail that Article 27 is a subset of Article 1. However, to the extent that
minorities need collective rights, 162 Kirgis' incorporation of Article 27 may
simply be a case of shorthand; Kirgis is rightly making the point that self-
determination is broader than secession, although whether it should be
read to include the principles of minority rights as a whole is open to ques-
tion. It also highlights the need to stop focusing on the type of group,
minority or people, and focus on the group's particular needs. 16 3
Kirgis also argues that secession is dependent on the extent of the
democratic character of the State; a balancing exercise, the greater the
amount of democracy, as evidenced by the quality of participation, the less
amount of self-determination is available for the group. "If a government is
at the high end of the scale of democracy, the only self-determination
claims that will be given international credence are those with minimal
destabilizing effect."' 16 4
However, the right to self-determination in whatever form is not just a
question of the democratic credentials of the State.' 65 The status of the
group itself may demand a certain type of democratic governance;' 6 6 a
State, which held regular elections with universal suffrage, might well still
fail to satisfy the right to self-determination of a particular group. 16 7 It is
increasingly recognized in the more recent literature that self-determina-
tion has an internal, on-going aspect that requires inclusion of all parts of
society in the governance of the State. 168 What is suggested here, however,
is that the nature of the group can determine that, in order to satisfy its
161. A point on which the HRC itself has not always been clear. In Lovelace v.
Canada, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 166 (1981); 2 HUM. RTS. LJ. 158 (1981),
7.2, the HRC spoke in terms of Article 27 requiring "State parties to accord protection to
ethnic and linguistic minorities .... (emphasis added). However, Article 27 talks of
States not denying the right, which implies that the right existed before the ICCPR, evi-
dently as part of custom. Moreover, individuals cannot enjoy their Article 27 rights
unless the minority group's own existence is preserved and promoted.
162. Regarding collective rights for minorities, see Copenhagen Document, supra note
59, at 35; Rec. 1201, supra note 64, art. 11.
163. See Brownlie, supra note 9, at 13. Article 5.1. ICCPR provides that nothing in the
Covenant should be interpreted by any State so as to limit or destroy the rights set out
therein. ICCPR, supra note 109, art. 5.1. According members of a group rights under
Article 27 cannot be used to deny that same group rights under Article 1 if they so
qualify. See also id. art. 47.
164. Kirgis, supra note 50, at 308-09.
165. See Franck, supra note 88, at 52; HRC General Comment 12(21), supra note 111,
at 6. See also Fox & ROTH, supra note 84, at 94;Jose Bengoa, Existence and Recognition of
Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/WP.2 (2000).
166. Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, The State, and Ethnic Communities in Political
Theory, in Kymlicka 1996, supra note 26, at 31. See also Brownlie, supra note 9, at 16.
167. G & E v. Norway, App. Nos. 9278/81 & 9415/81, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 30, 35 (1983).
168. E.g., Kirgis, supra note 50, at 306; Tomuschat, supra note 25, at 107; Hannum
1998, supra note 108, at 13.
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obligation to provide opportunities for participation in society, the State
must accord autonomy to that group. As Van Dyke explains, the legitimacy
of government is based on the consent of the governed, who are generally
assumed by political theory to be individuals.
The assumption is understandable if the population of the State is homoge-
nous, sharing a common culture. However, if the population is divided into
different communities, each cherishing and wanting to preserve its distinc-
tive identity, why should it be assumed that the consent that counts comes
from individuals? Cannot entire communities give or withhold consent as
collective units?169
The nature of the group and the democratic credentials of the State form a
symbiotic relationship. The fulfillment of the right to self-determination in
such circumstances provides a mechanism by which the conflicting enti-
ties, the group and the State, can resolve the apparent lack of legitimation
for the latter through, inter alia, autonomy for the former.
[The] basic claim underlying self-government rights is not simply that some
groups are disadvantaged within the political community (representational
rights), or that the political community is culturally diverse (polyethnic
rights). Instead, the claim is that there is more than one political commu-
nity, and that the authority of the larger State cannot be assumed to take
precedence over the authority of the constituent national communities. If
democracy is the rule of 'the people,' national minorities claim that there is
more than one people, each with the right to rule themselves. 170
True democratic governance recognizes autonomous groups and provides
for their autonomous status. 17 1 As the Human Rights Committee has
made clear, the fact that a State does not recognize the existence of minor-
ity groups does not mean that there are no minorities in that State deserv-
ing of the rights recognized under Article 27 of the ICCPR.17 2 Likewise,
the existence of groups requiring autonomy within the State is an objective
169. Van Dyke, supra note 166, at 45. "So democracy can only work if all groups in a
society feel that they are included, and that their rights will be respected. Often that
means rejecting a political system in which the winner takes all. It means ensuring by
one device or other, that minorities are given a permanent share of the power." Morti-
mer, supra note 9, at 24.
170. Kymlicka 1995, supra note 9, at 182. In the opening statement by the United
Nations Secretary-General at the World Conference on Human Rights 1993, Mr. Bout-
ros-Ghali spoke of democracy as the means by which to reconcile "individual rights and
collective rights, the rights of peoples and the rights of persons ... " United Nations
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Opening Statement at the World Conference
on Human Rights 1993 Uune 14, 1993).
171. See Thornberry, supra note 49, at 134. See also Gyula Csurgai, Proposition pour
I'Elaboration des Rfgimes d'autonomie pour Rdsoudre la Question des Communautts
Minoritaires de l'Europe Centrale et Balkanique, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/
CRP.2 (2000).
172. "The existence of an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority in a given State party
does not depend upon a decision by that State party but requires to be established by
objective criteria." U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 15th Sess., 5.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994). Furthermore, the fact that Article 27 speaks of the right set out
therein as one that "shall not be denied" indicates that minority rights pre-exist the
ICCPR. Similarly, those groups requiring autonomous forms of government possess it
through pre-existing obligations of Statehood imposed on the dominant majority.
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determination, and their existence determines the form of democratic gov-
ernance, such as federalism, 173 appropriate for that State.
Where national minorities 174 are regionally concentrated, the boundaries of
federal subunits can be drawn so that the national minority forms a majority
in one of the subunits. Under these circumstances, federalism can provide
extensive self-government for a national minority, guaranteeing its ability to
make decisions in certain areas without being outvoted by the larger
society. 175
It is the obligation of the State to provide proper autonomous structures,
recognizing the needs of groups within the State, thereby providing effec-
tive equality and a level playing field with the majority. In line with the
view that a human rights treaty imposes on a State the obligation to respect
the right, promote the right and, ultimately, fulfill its obligations, 176 then
autonomy in an appropriate degree might be that fulfillment of the right to
self-determination.
In sum, the right to secession, 17 7 if it exists at all, seems limited so far
to situations of colonial or alien domination. Autonomy, on the other
hand, is a more broadly available form of internal self-determination.
D. Autonomy-'Part of and 'Broader than' Self-Determination
The right to self-determination is broader than secession and is availa-
ble to peoples not under colonial or alien domination. The error in the
self-determination debate has been to focus on the beneficiaries, that is,
'peoples' as opposed to 'minorities,' rather than the conditions justifying
whatever form of self-determination is appropriate to the group; self-deter-
mination is about people, not just peoples. Much time and ink has been
wasted trying to justify the inclusion of minorities in the concept of Article
1 peoples. Kirgis recognized this error, but, in one sense, 'threw the baby
out with the bath water,' not allowing the nature of the group to define the
form of democratic governance required in the State. 178 Whether one
refers to the group as a people or a minority, both terms undefined in inter-
173. See Brendan O'Leary, An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation? A (neo-Diceyan)
Theory of the Necessity of a Federal Staatsvolk, and of Consociational Rescue, 7:3 NATIONS
& NATIONALISM 273 (2001).
174. Kymlicka does not place undue emphasis on the distinction between peoples,
nations, and national minorities. Kymlicka 1995, supra note 9, at 27.
175. Kymlicka 1995, supra note 9, at 27-28. See also Vernon Van Dyke, Collective
Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought, 44 J. POL. 21, 24-31
(1982). See also the redrawing of internal borders in the FSU to deal with the claims of
various minority groups. Whitehouse, supra note 27, at 15.
176. For the roots of this analysis, see generally Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence
Rights: Shall We Secure These Rights?, in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS?
(Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985); The Interdependence of Duties,
in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 83-95 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski eds., 1984); Henry
Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 689 (1987-88).
177. See generally Kirgis, supra note 50.
178. In seeking to include minority rights within self-determination, he also left him-
self open to the criticism that Articles 1 and 27 of the ICCPR are distinct-autonomy is
in fact the linking bridge. Kirgis, supra note 50, at 308
Cornell International Law Journal
national law. 179 For that matter and on that basis, 'pink bananas,' is irrele-
vant; the focus must be on the implementation of the right appropriate to
the needs of the group as it seeks to determine its own future and preserve
its own culture. 180 By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples enshrined in the Charter "[aill peoples have the right
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and
to pursue their economic, social and cultural development ... "181 To that
extent, self-determination includes the preservation of the group culture.
For some groups, the autonomy to preserve their own culture will be
the fullest extent of their self-determination, whereas for other groups it
will extend to political autonomy through a federal State structure. In that
sense, autonomy is a continuum, providing an appropriate degree of con-
trol to each group within society over its own affairs. International law
accords this right to autonomy to groups within society through two guar-
antees: the right to self-determination and the right of members of ethnic,
linguistic, and religious groups to enjoy their own culture. As the PC
noted in 1935, "[There] would be no true equality between a majority and a
minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions, and were conse-
quently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of
its being as a minority."'18 2 Also, as the Human Rights Committee in Love-
179. See Thornberry, supra note 49, at 124, for a description drafted by UNESCO
experts in 1989. See also Brownlie, supra note 9, at 16.
180. The desire to preserve its own culture is a prerequisite; the State is only obliged
to provide the proper environment and facilities, it should not seek to preserve a group
where the group lacks that will. See Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the
Democratic Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 40, at 130.
181. Drawing on the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 83, Principle V.
182. See Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935 on Minority Schools in Albania, 1935
P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 17. See also Sidoropoulos v. Greece, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1594
(1998) (where the European Court of Human Rights held that the refusal by the Greek
courts to register an organization calling itself "Home of Macedonian Civilization" vio-
lated Article 11, freedom of association, of the ECHR). Given that one only had the
proposed organization's aims as they had been set out in its draft memorandum of asso-
ciation, and those were of a wholly cultural nature, even if its true aim were to assert that
there was a "Macedonian" minority in Greece and that the Greek authorities did not
respect its rights, banning the organization was disproportionate. Id. at 43-47. A press
release by Amnesty International in September 1998 reported that the Greek authorities
have charged four members of the Rainbow Party, an ethnic Macedonian party, with
"causing and inciting mutual hatred among the citizens" for displaying a sign in Florina
in Greek and Macedonian which simply stated "Florina Committee." Press Release,
Amnesty International, Charges Against Members of the "Rainbow" Party Should be
Dropped, Sept. 11, 1998, available at http://www.amnesty.it/news/1998/indx0998.
httm. Nevertheless, it would seem the Greek government has now reversed the original
position as a result of the decision by the European Court of Human Rights. See Com-
mittee of Ministers, Appendix to Resolution DH (2000) 99:
In order to draw the attention of the courts directly concerned, the President of
the Supreme Court (Arios Pagos) sent on 30 October 1998 a circular to the judi-
cial authorities in the Department of Florina enclosing a Greek translation of the
judgment of the European Court in this case. Furthermore, the judgment of the
Court was published in extenso in the Syntagma legal review No. 2 of 1999, and
a comment on the judgment can be found in the Diki legal journal (November
1999). Finally, this judgment was also referred to in the book "European Con-
vention on Human Rights," 1999, p. 46. This book has been distributed, freely,
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lace noted in 1981 with respect to Article 27: "The Committee recognizes
the need to define the category of persons entitled to live on a reserve, for
such purposes as . . . protection of its resources and preservation of the
identity of its people. '183
The confusion prevalent in discussions on these topics stems from the
loose use of overlapping and undefined terminology. Autonomy is in one
sense but one aspect of self-determination, but it is also much broader than
a right solely of 'peoples' and extends to traditional minority rights. The
confusion has been enhanced, though, by the inclusion of clauses dealing
with autonomy, in the sense of regional or local self-government, in the
more recent international instruments dealing with minority rights.' 8 4
The confusion is avoidable if one considers only the degree of control over
its own affairs and the powers to achieve that end that the group requires,
and one does not worry whether what is undoubtedly a minority group is
also a 'people.' To take two examples, a religious group such as the Free
Presbyterians in Scotland would not want territorial self-government, but,
in satisfying Article 27 of the ICCPR, the State would necessarily permit it
to run its own internal affairs and to hold property for its own purposes-
in running the Church, it would be autonomous. 18 5 On the other hand,
to all first instance judges, courts of appeal and the Court of Cassation. The
Government of Greece is of the opinion that, considering the direct effect today
given to judgments of the European Court in Greek law (see notably the case of
Papageorgiou against Greece, Resolution DH (99) 714), the Greek courts will
not fail to prevent the kind of judicial error that was at the origin of the violation
found in this case.
183. Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 166, at 12, 15.
184. See Copenhagen Document, supra note 59, at 9[ 35; Rec. 1201, supra note 63, art.
11; Hungaro-Slovak Treaty, supra note 73, art. 15(4)(b).
185. See Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 8. Eur. Ct. H.R. 2843 (1997), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (holding that the refusal by a Greek civil
court to recognize that the church had legal personality violated Article 6.1 of the ECHR,
taken on its own or with Article 14). See also Committee of Ministers, Appendix to
Resolution DH (2000) 44 (where the Greek Government gave evidence that it had
passed a new law according the Catholic Church legal personality).
In Serif v. Greece, 1999-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999), the European Court of Human
Rights held that "punishing a person for the mere fact that he acted as the religious
leader of a group that willingly followed him can hardly be considered compatible with
the demands of religious pluralism in a democratic society" and was a violation of Arti-
cle 9. In Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, the Court in paragraph 62 held:
Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 must be
interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention which safeguards associa-
tive life against unjustified State interference. Seen in this perspective, the
believer's right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that the com-
munity will be allowed to function peacefully free from arbitrary State interven-
tion. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is
indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue at the
very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. It directly concerns not
only the organisation of the community as such but also the effective enjoyment
of the right to freedom of religion by all its active members. Were the organisa-
tional life of the community not protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all
other aspects of the individual's freedom of religion would become vulnerable.
Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 (European Court of Human Rights
Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm. The Court
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some ethnic-national groups are recognizable and distinct from the domi-
nant group within the State because of a difference of religion; in those
cases, mere autonomy over church affairs would not properly meet the
State's obligation to ensure the self-determination of all its peoples18t 6 and,
where appropriate, territorial self-government would be the true means
whereby the group would achieve self-determination through being
included in the democratic governance of the State. 187 Furthermore,
autonomy can meet the needs of an identifiable ethnic group that is not
concentrated in one region of the State but is distributed in clusters. 188 It
is autonomy that spans both Articles 1 and 27 of the ICCPR, its implemen-
tation under each Article being appropriate not only to the particular right,
but, more importantly, to the nature of the group, too.' 8 9 A right to auton-
omy, therefore, is both radical, since it applies to all groups in society,
whether deemed peoples or minorities, and, at the same time, the logical
consequence of two exiting rights, the right of peoples to self-determina-
tion and the right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own
culture.
IV. The Elements of Autonomy' 90
The right to autonomy is a right for the group to decide its own affairs,
determined by reference to the nature of the group within the society.
Although the degree of autonomy to be accorded will vary, there are, for the
went on to hold that "State action favouring one leader" or attempting to bring a divided
religious community together under a unified leadership would amount to interference
with freedom of religion as guaranteed under Article 9. Id. at 78. See also Metro.
Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99 (European Court of Human
Rights Dec. 13, 2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm. At the
time of writing, this judgment was only available in French.
186. See HRC General Comment 12(21), supra note note 111, at 121. See also Ahmet
Sadik v. Greece, 55 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22, 34 (1996) (prosecuting someone defined officially
by the government as a Muslim for calling himself a "Turk" was deemed by the European
Commission of Human Rights to violate the right to freedom of expression (Article 10)
under the ECHR. The case failed on other grounds before the Court, but this point was
not disputed). A similar situation arose in Raif Oglu v. Greece, App. No. 33738/96, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1 (1999), where a teacher was suspended and then dismissed, before being
reinstated, for referring to "Turkish teachers" and old Turkish place names in Western
Thrace. The Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights held the application
admissible. The Court struck the case out on June 27, 2000 because the matter had
been resolved.
187. Read together, paragraphs 2, 4, and 6 of the HRC General Comment 12(21),
supra note 111, would suggest that if all peoples within the State are free to determine
their political status, then mere non-discriminatory electoral laws are not an adequate
response; internal self-determination is a process. The Northern Irish Peace Agreement'
of 1998, for example, establishes a representative Assembly and, additionally, permits
the involvement of the Republic of Ireland in the governance of the Province. Northern
Ireland Peace Agreement, supra note 5, Strand 3.
188. E.g., Ethnic Russians tend to be found in the urban centers in Latvia. EAST &
PONTIN, supra note 46, at 305-06.
189. See generally CASSESE 1995, supra note 155.
190. See Jane Wright, Minority Groups, Autonomy and Self-Determination, 19 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 605 (1999).
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purposes of this paper, three facets to it-participation, culture, and finan-
cial matters. 19 1
A. Participatory Autonomy
Participation in this sense encompasses the idea of power-sharing
within the State. 19 2 That power-sharing might be reflected in a federated
State through self-government of a region where the group is in a major-
ity,19 3 considered above, or through participation in the political process
and the right for the group to run its own internal affairs. 194 The European
Commission of Human Rights has held that it is justifiable discrimination
to adopt a voting system better guaranteed to ensure electoral representa-
tion of a minority population at the expense of the majority, even within
just part of the State; 19 5 such a difference in treatment is designed to create
a level playing filed between the dominant group and all other groups in
the State. De Varennes gives examples from all parts of the world of federal
and non-federal autonomy arrangements. 196 The Hungarian Act LXXVII
of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities not only provides
for local minority governments, but also minority self-government at the
national level under ss5(1), 21 and 31. Whereas political autonomy is usu-
ally understood as self-government of a region of the State, 197 par-
ticipatory autonomy embraces that and these other forms, as well.19 8 It
191. GELLNER, supra note 15, at 118-19 (recognizing that where two nations arose
within the same State with sufficiently different cultures but with a similar economic
base, they would probably need to form "distinct cultural-political units, whether or not
they will be wholly sovereign").
192. See Arend Lijphart, Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minori-
ties in Power-Sharing Systems, in Kymlicka 1996, supra note 26, at 275. On the idea of
autonomy as connoting mutual dependencies, see ATTRACTA INGRAM, A POLITICAL THEORY
OF RIGHTS 157 (1994).
193. See Kimminich, supra note 152 at 83; Thornberry, supra note 49, at 101.
194. For a review of the various methods utilized by States to ensure participation, see
Fernand de Varennes, Towards Effective Political Participation and Representation of
Minorities, working paper prepared for the United Nations Working Group on Minori-
ties, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1998/WP.4, at 6-9 (1998). This paper is an extract
from a longer, forthcoming article by the author. See also Report of the OSCE Meeting of
Experts on National Minorities (July 19, 1991), § IV, available at http://www.htmh.hu/
dokumentumok/osceheneva.htm; Lund Recommendations on Effective Participation of
National Minorities in Public Life (HCNM/Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations) (Sept.
1999), available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/recommendations/lund/
index.php3; Towards Effective Participation of Minorities, ECMI Conference 1999, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.4 (1999); Josef Marko, On the Representation and
Participation of National Minorities in Decision-Making Processes, 4:1 H.R.L.R. 22 (1999).
195. Note the approach of the European Commission of Human Rights towards Arti-
cle 14 and electoral laws in Lindsay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8364/78, 3 C.M.L.R.
166, 170-71 (1979) and Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8765/79, 4 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 106, 123 (1982).
196. De Varennes, supra note 194, at 6-9. Federations are well-known, but Valle
d'Aosta in Italy and Gagauz-Yeri in Moldova are cited as non-federal systems. Id.
197. See Hannum 1996, supra note 13, at 466-68.
198. Minority Rights Group, Occasional Paper, Protection of Minority Rights in Europe:
Policy Recommendations, at 54-58 (1998) (on file with author). See also the joint Finn-
ish, Norwegian and Swedish policy of establishing Sami Parliaments (Samediggis): "The
parliaments have their own cultural funds, and now full-time presidents in Norway and
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has the dual aspect of providing the group with the political means to pre-
serve its own culture and identity whilst bringing it within the political
processes of the State. Further evidence that participation in political
affairs is recognized by international actors as a necessary facet of multi-
nation States can be found in the letters of the High Commissioner on
National Minorities of the OSCE to various governments; 199 while these
are hortatory in nature, they are based on international instruments,
legally binding and otherwise, dealing with minorities and they prompt
State practice, thereby providing evidence of the incorporation of these
standards in international law through custom. 200 The 1991 Geneva Meet-
ing of Experts on National Minorities, as well as noting that local, autono-
mous and territorial administration had been appropriate for certain
minority groups, advocated "self-administration by a national minority of
aspects concerning its identity" and "elected bodies and assemblies of
national minority affairs."201
The United Kingdom is going through a process of extending par-
ticipatory autonomy. One example is to be found in the Northern Ireland
Finland. The three Saami [sic] parliaments can also report to the national parliaments
but they do not have legislative powers." Seurujarvi-Kari, Saamis Seek Firmer Autonomy,
5:4 OSCE Review 7 (1997). On autonomy in Finland, see Lauri Hannikainen, Examples
of Autonomy in Finland: the Territorial Autonomy of the Aaland Islands and the Cultural
Autonomy of the Indigenous Saami People, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/WP.5
(2001). See also Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations, Notification Concerning the General
Rights of the German Minority, June 7, 1955, Den.-F.R.G., Statement of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Rights of the Danish Minority, avail-
able at http://www.ecmi.de/doc/aboutborder declarations.html; U.N. ESCOR, 50th
Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1998/WP.2 (1998); and Russian Federation
Law of Apr. 1999, supra note 81.
199. The HCNM's letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia expressly
recommended in order "to promote inter-ethnic harmony ... the partial introduction of
a system of proportional representation." Letter from Max van der Stoel, OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities, to Stevo Crvenkovski, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Macedonia (FYROM) (Nov. 16, 1994), available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/docu-
ments/recommendations/fyrom/1994/web-maced1194.pdf. Furthermore, he went on
to express regret that no progress had been made in relation to:
[Tihe law on local self-government, notwithstanding the fact that clarity about
the role and competences of local government units is clearly needed. I would
recommend that the draft law on this subject of July 1993 should be submitted
again to the newly elected Parliament. There is even more reason to do so
because articles 79, 80, 81 and 82 of this draft law contain provisions for the
official use of the languages and alphabets of the ethnic nationalities in units of
local self-government in which there is a majority or a significant number
(according to article 79, para 2, 20%) of members of ethnic nationalities. Id.
The HCNM's statement of 9 November 1998 regarding Macedonia calls for participation
at the local level by all citizens, including members of national minorities. See also How-
ard, supra note 60, at 684. The HCNM also calls for proper financing of local institu-
tions. See also Letter from Max Vander Stoel, CSE High Commissioner on National
Minorities, to Laszlo Kovacs, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 18, 1994, avail-
able at http://www.riga.lv/minelres/count/hungary/94071Br.htm.
200. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 L.CJ. 14 (June 27), at
19. Macedonia was even prepared to commit itself to OSCE standards, including, appar-
ently, paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document, supra note 59, before its admission to
the organization. See HCNM's letter, supra note 199.
201. OSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, supra note 194, § IV.
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Peace Agreement of April 1998.202 Given that the nationalist and unionist
populations could not practically have separate administrations within the
Province, autonomy is granted to the Province as a whole with participa-
tion and control for both communities provided through various mecha-
nisms.20 3 The Agreement provided not only for an Assembly elected by
proportional representation, which is to be inclusive in its membership,
and is to operate with due regard to both traditions, requiring cross-com-
munity support for "key decisions," but also in addition there are avenues
for the Republic of Ireland to influence developments directly.20 4 There is
a North-South Ministerial Council to discuss issues of concern to Belfast
and Dublin and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference:
In recognition of the Irish Government's special interest in Northern Ireland
and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern arise in relation to
Northern Ireland, there will be regular and frequent meetings of the Confer-
ence concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on which the
Irish Government may put forward views and proposals. These meetings, to
be co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, would also deal with all-island and cross-border co-
operation on non-devolved issues. 20 5
Territorial autonomy has also been given to the people of Scotland
through the Scotland Act 1998.206 Scotland has its own parliament with
tax raising powers and most matters of concern to Scotland will be
devolved from the United Kingdom parliament at Westminster. This sup-
plements the pre-existing autonomy that had existed with respect to the
legal system, the Church and the education system ever since the Act of
Union in 1707.207
Finally, it can be argued that participatory autonomy, as part of the
right to internal self-determination under Article 1 of the ICCPR, is a justi-
ciable right within Europe and, possibly, the Americas. The Human Rights
Committee has held it cannot entertain communications under Article 1
because the Optional Protocol is limited to individual claims;20 8 such does
not deny the State's obligation to its minority populations, merely their




206. Scotland Act of 1998, supra note 5, §§ 28-30, Sch. 4 and 5. On the 1998 Act, see
Jane Wright, Devolution in Scotland: An exercise in internal self-determination, 13
REGIONAL CONTACT 243, 243 (1998).
207. It is unclear whether an attempt to change a fundamental term of the Articles of
Union would be justiciable. See MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.L.T. 255 (1
Div.), at 411-13.
208. See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 13.3, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1990); A.B. v. Italy, Communica-
tion No. 413/1990, U.N. GAOR, 46th, 3.2, U.N. Doc. A/46/40 (1991). See also Apirana
Mahuika v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 9.2,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C1701D/547/1993 (1992) (where the Human Rights Committee held
that "the provisions of Article 1 may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights
protected by the Covenant, in particular Article 27").
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ability to enforce this right through quasi-legal mechanisms. 20 9 Neverthe-
less, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 210 and
Fundamental Freedoms and the American Convention on Human Rights
allow for petitions by groups.211 However, neither of those regional Con-
ventions provide for self-determination. 21 2 On the other hand, they both
provide that nothing in the Conventions "shall be construed as limiting or
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which
may be ensured under ... any other agreement to which it is a Party."
2 13
Although Ominayak and South Tirol case 214 clearly state that no claim can
be brought under the Optional Protocol before the HRC in relation to Arti-
cle 1 ICCPR, that does not detract from the fact that self-determination is a
human right recognized in both Covenants; it is simply not open to direct
consideration by way of communication to the Human Rights Committee.
Thus, it would be a human right ensured under another agreement to
which the State is a party for the purposes of Article 53 ECHR and Article
29(b) ACHR. In General Comment 12(21),215 the HRC stated that "all
States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate reali-
zation of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination."216 If a
209. "The correlation of rights with justiciability is an understandable attitude from
the domestic-law point of view. But, of course, international lawyers are very familiar
with the phenomenon that ... it is not possible to bring claims in vindication of rights
held in international law. The absence of the possibility of recourse to third-party judi-
cial procedures is certainly not the test of whether the right exists or not. To the interna-
tional lawyer, the existence of the right is tested by reference to the sources of
international law." Higgins, supra note 99, at 100.
210. ECHR, supra note 62, art. 34. See also App. No. 8191/78, RassemblementJuras-
sien & Unit Jurassienne v. Switzerland, 17 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1979);
Stankov, App. Nos. 29221/95 & 29225/95; Muonio Saami Village v. Sweden, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2000). On the ECHR, see generally Geoff Gilbert, The Burgeoning Minority Rights
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 64. Article 64 of the
ACHR permits States to seek advisory opinions from the Inter-American Court on the
interpretation of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights within the
Americas. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art. 44, OAS Treaty
Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]. See SCOTT DAvIDSON, THE INTER-
AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 243-49 (1997) (the advisory opinion jurisdiction of the
European Court of Human Rights is much more circumscribed and is instigated by the
Committee of Ministers).
211. ACHR, supra note 210, art. 44.
212. Cf. Preamble to the Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 112, at 6.
213. ECHR, supra note 62, art. 53. See also ACHR, supra note 210, art. 29(b); Sidoro-
poulos, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1594, at 44 (referring to the obligations of Greece towards minor-
ities under OSCE instruments). See also Geoff Gilbert, Minority Rights under the Council
of Europe, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE 'NEW' EUROPE 53 (Peter Cumper & Steven Wheatley
eds., 1999).
214. Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, 13.3. Apirana Mahuika v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/
1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 3.2.
215. HRC General Comment 12(21), supra note 111, 6.
216. As already mentioned, paragraph 6 is dealing with the obligations on the State
with respect to Article 1.3, but this description of self-determination is applicable to all
instances in Article 1. "With regard to paragraph 1 of article 1, State parties should
describe the constitutional and political processes which in practice allow the exercise of
this right." Id. See also id. at 4.
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State effectively prevented political participation by a minority group, then
that might violate that group's right to self-determination within the State
under Article 1 ICCPR. The group might then seek to assert discrimina-
tion under Article 14 of the ECHR,2 1 7 taken together with Article 11218
and Protocol 1 Article 3219 (interpreted in these circumstances to include
this sense of self-determination, the right to political participation implic-
itly recognized in the German Communist Party case), 220 on the basis of
Article 53 Echo's incorporation of Article 1 ICCPR as a human right
"ensured under... any other agreement to which it is a Party."'2 2 1 Such an
interpretation has yet to be litigated,2 22 but given that human rights are
guaranteed by States under the ECHR and the ACHR, 22 3 the application of
self-determination would be within the existing State structure, that is,
autonomy.
22 4
In United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) v. Turkey,225 the issues
were not presented in terms of Article 1 ICCPR and Article 53 ECHR.
Here, the Turkish government had sought the dissolution of the TBKP,
which the Constitutional Court granted. Part of the reasoning was that the
TBKP had allegedly carried out activities likely to undermine the territorial
integrity of the State and the unity of the nation, in that it had called for a
"peaceful, democratic, and fair solution for the Kurdish problem. '2 26 The
European Court of Human Rights, holding that democracy was the only
political model contemplated and compatible with the ECHR, held that
Turkey violated Article 11 when it banned the TBKP. 2 27 More pertinently
217. ACHR, supra note 210, art. 1.
218. Id. art. 16.
219. Id. art. 23.
220. K.P.D. v. F.R.G., App. No. 250/57, 1 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON H.R. 222 (1957) [herein-
after the German Communist Party case]. By analogy, this case must imply the right to
political participation in normal circumstances. See Ignatane v. Latvia, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. II, at 191, U.N. Doc. A/56/40, 4.3. See
also Judge de Meyer of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 556 (Macdonald, Matscher, & Petzold eds., 1993)
(questioning the views of the Commission in X v. F.R.G. 3 D.R. 98, 100 (1975)). See also
Apirana Mahuika, Communication No. 547/1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 9.2.
221. ACHR, supra note 210, art. 29(b). '
222. The opportunity may arise in Sadak v. Turkey, App. Nos. 2514494, 26149-54/95,
& 27100-01/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), where a claim with respect to Article 3 of Protocol
1 was declared admissible. The applicants were Party of Democracy (DEP) members of
the Turkish Parliament who had their parliamentary mandate removed by the Constitu-
tional Court as a consequence of the dissolution of the DEP in June 1994; some were
arrested and some fled the country.
223. ECHR, supra note 62, art. 1; ACHR, supra note 210, arts. 1-2.
224. It should be noted that in the European context, while it would be the European
Court of Human Rights that would pronounce on whether there had been a violation of
the rights in the ECHR read in conformity with Article 1 ICCPR, the execution of the
judgment is supervised by the Committee of Ministers. ECHR, supra note 63, art. 46.2.
In Stankov, App. Nos. 29221/95 & 29225/95, at 97, the European Court of Human
Rights held that there could even calls for secession without there automatically being a
threat to a country's territorial integrity and national security.
225. TBKP, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 133, at 9.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 45, 61.
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for the present debate, it noted that:
[Although the TBKP refers in its programme 2 28 to the Kurdish 'people' and
'nation' and Kurdish 'citizens', it neither describes them as a 'minority' 2 29
nor makes any claim-other than for recognition of their existence-for them
to enjoy special treatment or rights, still less a right to secede from the rest of
the Turkish population. On the contrary, the programme states: 'The TBKP
will strive for a peaceful, democratic and fair solution of the Kurdish prob-
lem, so that the Kurdish and Turkish peoples may live together of their free
will within the borders of the Turkish Republic, on the basis of equal rights
and with a view to democratic restructuring founded on their common inter-
ests.' With regard to the right to self-determination, the TBKP does no more
in its programme than deplore the fact that because of the use of violence, it
was not 'exercised jointly, but separately and unilaterally', adding that 'the
remedy for this problem is political' and that '[i]f the oppression of the Kurd-
ish people and discrimination against them are to end, Turks and Kurds
must unite.' 23 0
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights not only acknowledged
the right of the Kurdish people to be recognized as a group within Turkish
society, but also that the right to self-determination must be "exercised
jointly" and that it can be fulfilled following a "democratic restructuring"
without destroying the territorial integrity of Turkey. 23 ' In Socialist Party
v. Turkey,232 the European Court of Human Rights used Article 11 again
where a political party had been dissolved because of its program.
The Court notes that, read together, the statements put forward a political
programme with the essential aim being the establishment, in accordance
with democratic rules, of a federal system in which Turks and Kurds would
be represented on an equal footing and on a voluntary basis .... In the
Court's view, the fact that such a political programme is considered incom-
patible with the current principles and structures of the Turkish State does
not make it incompatible with the rules of democracy. It is of the essence of
democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and
debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently organ-
ized, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.2 33
Furthermore, with respect to political parties whose role is essential to the
proper functioning of democracy, the restrictions found in paragraph 2 of
228. Id. at 9.
229. Contrary to the Turkish Constitution. TBKP, App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 121, 133, at 10, 11, 55 (referring to Article 14 of the Constitution and § 81 of Law
No. 2820 "on the regulation of political parties").
230. Id. at 56.
231. See also Sidoropoulos, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1594, at 43, 46; Ahmet Sadik, 55 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 22, at 19; see also Rainbow Party case, supra note 182.
232. Socialist Party v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51, 66 (1998). See also OZDEP v.
Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, 703, at 41. In Alabay & Giizel v.
Turkey, App. No. 41334/98, Eur. Ct. of H.R. (First Section), September 26, 2000, a claim
based on Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 was declared admissible with respect to the dissolu-
tion by the Turkish Constitutional Court of the Democracy & Change Party (DDP) on
the ground that the DDP's constitution made reference to promoting the rights of the
Kurdish minority in Turkey. See also Zana v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 667 (1999). Cf.
Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2002).
233. Socialist Party v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51.
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Article 11 are to be construed strictly. 234
European Court of Human Rights went further its 2001 decision,
Stankov and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria.235 It held
that ethnic groups not only had the right to political recognition, but also
political activity under Article 11. "The inhabitants of a region in a coun-
try are entitled to form associations in order to promote the region's special
characteristics. The fact that an association asserts a minority conscious-
ness cannot in itself justify an interference with its rights under Article 11
of the [ECHR]. ' 2 36
Freedom of assembly under Article 11 protects demonstrations that
might annoy or give offense.2 3 7 According to the Court in Stankov, minor
incidents threatening public order should not lead to a ban on an organiza-
tion's meetings; any isolated incident could be dealt with through individ-
ual criminal prosecution. Where Stankov goes further is that it states that
a group of persons might request secession and democratic principles
demand that the State permit it. 2 3 8 This does not recognize a right to
secession; merely that States cannot exclude the topic from political
debate. 2 39 The combination of rights to freedom of expression and free-
dom of assembly for minority groups shows how political participation for
such groups can be upheld through a judicial process and casts doubt on
arguments that a right to autonomy could not be justiciable.
B. Cultural Autonomy2 40
In its General Comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights
Committee stated that:
234. OZDEP v. Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, 703, at 44; Stankov,
App. Nos. 29221/95 & 29225/95, at 84.
235. Stankov, App. Nos. 29221/95 & 29225/95, at 89.
236. In this case, marches, meetings and demonstrations. Id. at 89. See also OZDEP
v. Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, 703, at 44 (where the Court held
"there can be no justification for hindering a political group"); Ignatane v. Latvia, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. II, at 191, U.N. Doc. A/56/40,
7.3 (where the author of the communication to the Human Rights Committee had been
arbitrarily barred from standing for election contrary to Article 25 ICCPR on the basis
of language skills which were inappropriately tested. The Human Rights Committee
held that discrimination based on language was prohibited under Article 2 ICCPR, so
only if the difference in treatment were reasonable and objectively justifiable would it be
justified).
237. OZDEP v. Turkey, App. No. 23995/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, 703, at 86.
238. Stankov, App. Nos. 29221/95 & 29225/95, at 97.
239. Incitement to violence, rejection of democratic principles, and seeking the expul-
sion of others from the territory would allow for restrictions on the Article 11 right. Id.
at 97, 100.
240. See HANNUM 1996, supra note 13, at 458-63; Asbjorn Eide, Sven Greni, & Maria
Lundberg, Cultural Autonomy: Concept, Content, History and Role in World Order, in
SUKsl, supra note 25, at 251-76. See also Examples Of Best Practices In The Area Of
Minority Protection, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub,2/AC.5/1998/WP.2, at 4-5 (1998); Asbjorn
Eide, Cultural Autonomy and territorial Democracy: A Recipe for Harmonious Group
Accommodation?, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ AC.5/2001/WP.4 (2000).
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[Although] the rights protected under article 27 are individual rights, 24 1
they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its
culture, language, or religion. Accordingly, positive measures by States may
also be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its
members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practise
their religion, in community with the other members of the group. 242
As was noted above in the Minority Schools in Albania case, 243 without their
own institutions, the minority's culture and distinctiveness will disappear
and they will be assimilated into the majority population. 244 Cultural
autonomy has been a focus of attention within Europe in the 1990s. Cul-
ture requires that children be educated about the history of all groups in
the State. The Hague Recommendations Regarding Minority Education
Rights deals mainly with mother-tongue education, but it also expects
States to ensure the teaching to all of the histories, cultures, and traditions
of national minorities. 24 5 Beyond schooling, a minority cannot preserve its
identity and culture if it is not permitted to use its own language, the topic
addressed in the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations' Oslo Recommenda-
tions of February 1998.246 Additionally, however, it needs to be accepted
that minority cultures can only be preserved and promoted where the
group can govern its own cultural affairs and feed into national plans, par-
ticularly on education. Culture, in this sense, is a very broad concept and
may well extend to preserving a way of life. 2 4 7 In many ways, cultural
241. See also the right to the benefits of culture in Article 14 of the San Salvador
Protocol to the ACHR, supra note 111.
242. HRC General Comment 12(21), supra note 111, at 6.2. See also Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 24(52), General comment on issues relating to reservations
made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in
relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.6 (1994), 8 (where Article 27 was expressed to be a peremptory norm of interna-
tional law).
243. Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935 on Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C..J.
(ser. A/B) No. 64, at 17. See also Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 23 Eur. H.R.
Rep., 478 (1999).
244. Cf. Galenkamp, supra note 79, at 75. See Estonia's Law on Cultural Autonomy of
1925; AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERN-
MENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 183 (1984). See also Sidoropoulos, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R.
1594, at 44 (where the European Court of Human Rights held that the inhabitants of a
region in a country are entitled to form associations in order to promote the region's
special characteristics). There is a danger where the State seeks to control the adminis-
tration of a minority group that it will restrict democratic pluralism. Serif v. Greece,
1999-4X Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999), at 52-53.
245. See Annex to Siemienski, Education rights of minorities: the Hague Recommenda-
tions, working paper for the Working Group on Minorities, May 1997, 19, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1997/WP.3. The recommendations were drafted by the Foundation
on Inter-Ethnic Relations at the request of the OSCE's HCNM. See also Cyprus v. Tur-
key, App. No. 25781/94, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep., 478, at 476.
246. Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities,
particularly, recommendations, 6, 7 and 9 on establishing associations, funding and
access to media. See generally Taylor, supra note 21.
247. See Apirana Mahuika v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., 9.5; G & E v. Norway, App. Nos. 9278/81 & 9415/81, 35 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 30, at 35; Buckley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20348/92,
23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101 (1997). The Buckley case failed in the Court,, but the principle
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autonomy is the most important right of groups within the State. 248
C. Financial Autonomy249
The need for financial autonomy is well-established, yet it is often the
most difficult to achieve. Nanda, arguing for a wider right to secede, was
prepared to grant such if the ethnic group was deprived of its right to par-
ticipate in the wealth and resources of the State. 250 While not agreeing
with his outcome, financial autonomy is a prerequisite to participatory and
cultural autonomy. 251 The common clauses in the WWI peace treaties
provided for an equitable share to minorities of budgets for educational,
religious or charitable purposes.25 2 The Aaland Islands received more
favorable treatment; the local government bodies were only to subsidize
Swedish schools and had powers to use certain tax revenues for their own
requirements. 253 More recently, common Article 1.2 of the two Covenants
provided: "All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natu-
ral wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its
own means of subsistence. ' 254 Under Article 31 of the 1994 Declaration
on Indigenous Peoples, such peoples were to be provided with autonomous
government along with "ways and means for financing these autonomous
functions. '255 The 1991 Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minori-
ties noted the positive results obtained by the funding of teaching of minor-
ity languages to the general public and the provision of financial assistance
enunciated in the Commission was not rejected and formed the basis for the partly
dissenting opinion of Liddy, Trechsel, Thune, Rozakis, Ress, Perenic and Svdby in
Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep., 478, 3 (dissenting), regarding
the destruction of the homes of the Turkish Cypriot community. See also Noack v. Ger-
many, App. No. 46346/99, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng.
248. See Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation: Hungary, at 6, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.1150 (1996); Concluding observations of
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at 15, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/
SR.1150 (1996). See also Human Rights Committee's Comments on Estonia, at 23, 36,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.59 (1995) (calling for the inclusion of all the types of
minority recognised for the purposes of Article 27 ICCPR within the Estonian Law on
Cultural Autonomy); General Comment 23(50), supra note 111, 5.1-5.2
249. See the Preamble to the ACHR Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 112; see also
HANNUM 1996, "upra note 13, at 463-66.
250. Nanda, supra note 143, at 452.
251. Consider Kymlicka 1995, supra 9, at 179-80, on the relationship between pov-
erty and participation in the national culture.
252. E.g., Article 9 bis of the Polish Treaty: "In towns and districts where there is a
considerable proportion of Polish nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic
minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and
application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State,
municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes." It was not
the fault of the minority guarantees that the economies of these new States were so weak
in the inter-War period.
253. MACARTNEY, supra note 16, at 261.
254. ICCPR, supra note 109, art. 1.2.
255. Draft Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, supra note 80, art. 31.
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to persons belonging to national minorities who "wish to exercise their
right to establish and maintain their own educational, cultural, and relig-
ious institutions, organizations, and associations. ' '25 6
The HCNM also called on Macedonia in his November 1998 statement
to finance properly local institutions.25 7 Interestingly, in examining the
needs of the indigenous peoples of Russia's far north, the Minority Rights
Group, referring to the 1989 meeting of experts at Tyumen, held that they
needed autonomy "underpinned by two principles: legal guarantees to land
and budgetary allocations made directly to the minorities."258 The Hun-
garian Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities
also provides for financial autonomy.2 59
It cannot be said that in the drafting of all these instruments, the
financial implications of autonomy have been forgotten or ignored. Fur-
thermore, this approach reflects the idea that all should participate in the
wealth of the State and that economic and social rights are as important as
civil and political ones.
Together, participatory, cultural, and financial autonomy, appropriate
to the needs of the group, are the pre-eminent means of providing for the
right to self-determination of non-colonial peoples and the rights of minor-
ities within the State structure.
Conclusion
The nation-State is a myth and always has been.260 The genocide and
forcible assimilation of minority groups through the centuries is ample tes-
timony that there never have been mono-ethnic States.2 6 1 This is not to
condemn President Wilson at Versailles, for he too saw the limited scope
for solving the "minority problem. '2 62 Rather it is to condemn interna-
tional law which has yet to cope with groups of individuals. It is the lack of
a voice on the international stage for entities other than States, which has
made secession seem so appealing, and autonomy, viewed as a privilege
within the gift of the State, as second best. 263 There are those, though,
256. OSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, supra note 194, at 7.
257. Letter from the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) to the gov-
ernment of Macedonia, supra note 199.
258. Nikolai Vakhtin, MRG: Native Peoples of the Russian Far North 31 (M.R.G.
1992).
259. Hungarian Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities
(1993), §§ 27, 37. See also Gybrgy Rti, Hungary and the Problem of National Minorities,
HUNGARIAN QUARTERLY 71 (1995) (on file with the Hungarian Embassy) (indicating that
Hungary's foreign trade policy ought to be tied to the treatment of ethnic Hungarian
minorities in the trading partners). See also Recommendation 7 of the Oslo Recommen-
dations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, supra note 252.
260. Kymlicka 1996, supra note 26, at 52; SETON-WATSON, supra note 14, at 5.
261. Stavenhagen, supra note 23, at 21.
262. See Whelan, supra note 45, at 108; A.M. Gallagher, The Enduring Legacy: Reflec-
tions on Versailles,'in EUROPE AN) ETHNICITY 197 (Dunn & Fraser eds., 1996).
263. Cf. Hurst Hannum, The Limits of Sovereignty and Majority Rule: Minorities, Indig-
enous Peoples and the Right to Autonomy, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 21
(Lutz, Hannum, & Burke eds., 1989). Franck, supra note 12, at 382, points out: "[Tlhe
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who would argue that while lawyers can be involved in the negotiation of
autonomy within the State, it is ultimately a political decision.264 Indeed,
they would argue that since the content of the right is variable, that it is not
a legal right.
It is perhaps immaterial whether one affirms the existence of a legal 'right'
with an indeterminate content, or denies the existence of the 'right' because
of its indeterminate content. Politically, of course, it may make quite a dif-
ference, because the former view offers the opportunity to clothe the argu-
ments for one's own favored '[groupi' in the garb of impeccable legal
legitimacy. 2
65
First, Pomerance is wrong to assert that that the content of autonomy
is indeterminate, for it is no more indeterminate than the acknowledged
right to freedom of religion. What is indeterminate is its implementation.
However, the fact that the right can only be concretized by reference to
local facts does not mean that the right itself is uncertain; merely that its
implementation must be case specific-international human rights law has
long accepted that rights need a practical context.266 And just because it is
non-justiciable in most instances, that again does not detract from its sta-
tus as a right in international law:26 7 the corollary is that the State is under
an obligation to accord autonomy by reason of existing international
commitments.
Autonomy in appropriate measure needs to be seen as a right of all
groups within the State, nations, peoples, or minorities. The foregoing
attempts to show how autonomy for all groups within the State can be
justified under existing international instruments and to outline the frame-
work for its content. Where a group within society is able to assert a claim
to control its own affairs, it should be accorded the right so to do under
international law. The right to autonomy for groups in society is a neces-
sary consequence of the combined effect of the right to self-determination
and the rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own cul-
ture. As such, a principled right to autonomy would provide in practical
terms appropriate rights for all groups within the State, bridging the gap
between the self-determination of peoples and minority rights.
international system, by reserving status, voice and rewards only for those ethnic and
tribes that have achieved Statehood, further conduces to virulent secessionist national-
ism." See also Tremlett, supra note 4, at 11 (discussing the Basque plans for a referen-
dum and the Spanish Prime Minister's rejection of the "right to self-determination").
264. See Koskenniemi, supra 18, at 269; S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International
Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, in Kymlicka 1996, supra note 26, at
321. See also Reference re Secession of Que., [19981 2 S.C.R. 217, 100-02 (Can.).
265. POMERANCE, supra at 92, at 67.
266. David Feldman, Human Rights Treaties, Nation States and Conflicting Moralities, 1
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LAW 61 (1995).
267. See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 100, supra note 99

